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PUBLIC ASSURANCE OF
AN ADEQUATE MINIMUM INCOME
IN OLD AGE:
THE ERRATIC PARTNERSHIP
BETWEEN SOCIAL INSURANCE
AND PUBLIC ASSISTANCE*
Peter W. Martint
[I]t is my hope that soon the United States will have a na-
tional system under which no needy man or woman within our
borders will lack a minimum old-age pension which will provide
adequate food, adequate clothing, and adequate lodging to the
end of the road without having to go to the poorhouse to get it.
I look forward to a system coupled with that, a system which, in
addition to this bare minimum, will enable those who have
faithfully toiled in any occupation to build up additional se-
curity for their old age which will allow them to live in comfort
and in happiness.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Speech to the Teamsters Union,
September 11, 1940.'
Social insurance and public assistance .are distinctly differ-
ent mechanisms for the protection of people against untoward
* Copyright © 1979, Peter W. Martin.
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1961, Cornell University; J.D. 1964,
Harvard University.
I Quoted in A. ALTMEYER, THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 126 (1966).
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contingencies. Both have internal requirements for effective
performance. Like the two wheels of a cart, they can effectively
support a load if they are reasonably matched in size and
strength. If they are not so matched the cart lunges to the weak
side ....
J.D. Brown, An American Philosophy of Social Security.2
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INTRODUCTION
For over forty years, public assurance of an adequate
minimum income to older Americans has been a legislated na-
tional goal supported by extraordinarily broad popular accep-
tance. 3 Throughout that period, the nation has had not one but
a pair of programs committed to this purpose: a contributory "so-
cial insurance" program commonly called Social Security and a
need-tested or public assistance program, until recently, Old Age
Assistance (OAA). Both were established by a single piece of
legislation-the Social Security Act of 1935. 4
Time has dramatically altered the respective shares of these
two programs in the overall effort (see Figure 1). In part, the
dynamics of the 1935 legislative scheme have been responsible.
But subsequent congressional modifications reflecting changing
notions about the proper relative roles of social insurance and
public assistance, as well as other political forces, have also played
a major role. As these internal shifts have occurred, the composite
system formed by the two programs has grown enormously (see
Figure 2). In several ways, this system has only recently attained
maturity, as measured by reasonably comprehensive coverage and
adequate benefits.
3 The commitment of the federal government to income support for the elderly dates
back to 1935, the year the Social Security Act was passed. See, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, JR.,
THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 315 (1958) ("For all the defects of the Act, it still meant a
tremendous break with the inhibitions of the past. The federal government was at last
charged with the obligation to provide its citizens a measure of protection from the hazards
and vicissitudes of life.").
judicial acceptance of that goal as well as the Act's means came less than two years
later in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937). The Supreme Court's opinion, written by
justice Cardozo, observed:
Congress did not improvise a judgment when it found that the award of
old age benefits would be conducive to the general welfare. ... A great mass of
evidence was brought together supporting the policy which finds expression in
the act. Among the relevant facts are these: The number of persons in the
United States 65 years of age or over is increasing proportionately as well as
absolutely. What is even more important the number of such persons unable to
take care of themselves is growing at a threatening pace.
Id. at 641-42.
Popular support for this form of governmental activity was high in 1935 and sub-
sequently grew to near unanimity. See M. SCHILTZ, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCIAL
SECURITY 1935-1965, at 35-36 (1970). During the first decade or so, this remarkable level
of public acceptance existed side by side with considerable confusion about the relevant
programs and widespread dissatisfaction with their payment levels. See id. at 40-49, 79-88.
1 Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 1-6, 201-210, 49 Stat. 620 (current version at
42 U.S.C. §§ 301-306, 401-432 (1976)). A variety of state and local old-age pension plans
did exist prior to the Social Security Act. See F. BOND, R. BABER, J. VIEG, L. PERRY, A.
SCAFF & L. LEE, OUR NEEDY AGED 39-68 (1954); SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, SOCIAL SECURITY
IN AMERICA 155-66 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Soc. SEC. IN AMERICA].
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174 (1960); Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, Table 23,
at 57.
Maturity has coincided with an internal change more rev-
olutionary than any other in the system's history. In late 1972,
Congress voted to replace federal grant-in-aid support of state
administered OAA programs with a new combination of federal
and state aid, anchored by the federally funded and administered
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. 5 Although SSI
began operation only in January 1974, it has already experienced
several major congressional modifications. 6 Thus, while the "sys-
tem" as a whole has matured, a critical component is still in its
formative years.
As the system has matured and changed, we have aged as a
nation. Our elderly population has increased significantly in both
absolute and percentage terms during recent decades.7 Con-
5 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1976).
6 See text accompanying notes 194-99 infra.
7 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF
AGING AND THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3-4 (Current Population Re-
ports, Series P-23, No. 59, 1976) [hereinafter cited as ASPECTS OF AGING]. In 1940, the first
year the Social Security program paid out monthly benefits to retired workers, the country
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sequently, adequate income beyond the "working years" has be-
come a more pressing political and social issue. 8  Although the
steady increase in the percentage of the total population sixty-five
and over may cease for a short period around the turn of the
century, this trend of growth-both absolute and pro-
portionate-is projected to continue. 9
As their numbers have increased, the elderly have also grown
substantially more dependent on retirement income programs-
tending both to live longer after retirement and to withdraw from
the work force at an earlier age."' Together, the two national
income programs for the elderly now represent the single most
significant source of income to the elderly as a whole. The pro-
grams have special importance to those older people who have
difficulty maintaining an adequate income measured in absolute
terms, not simply in relation to earlier income from work.
These interconnected political, legislative, and demographic
developments provide impetus and focus for this study of the
evolution of the present legal relationship between "social insur-
ance" and "public assistance" or need-tested benefits for the el-
derly. While economic and demographic data will necessarily fig-
ure prominently in this investigation, legal materials command
center stage. To understand the functional relationship between
social insurance and public assistance, one must scrutinize statu-
tory eligibility and benefit formulae, grant-in-aid limits, and other
related features of two intricate statutory schemes. Such legal de-
tails not only specify the contributions of social insurance and
public assistance to elderly individuals in varying income situations
at a particular time, but also largely determine how the programs
will grow (or diminish) in relation to each other. This Article
traces both forms of interaction.
contained 9.0 million persons 65 and over, comprising 6.8% of the total population. Id.,
Table 2-1, at 3, Table, at 9. Social Security reached less than 1% of them; OAA, roughly
21%. Soc. SEC. BULL-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, Table 23, at 57 [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1975 ANN. SuPP.]. By 1975, America's 22.4 million elderly comprised 10.5% of
the population. ASPECTS OF AGING, supra, Table 2-1, at 3, Table 2-4, at 8. Social Security
reached almost nine out of ten; SSI, the successor to OAA, about one out of ten. 1975
ANN. Supp., supra, Table 23, at 57.
' See, e.g., Samuelson, Busting the U.S. Budget-The Costs of An Aging America, 10 NAT'L
J. 256 (1978).
,a See ASPECTS OF AGING, supra note 7, at 4.
"' See id., Table 5-I, at 26; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HAND-
BOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 1975-REFERENCE EDITION, Table 4, at 35 [hereinafter cited as
1975 LABOR STATISTICS].
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Ironically, the growth of our national system of old-age in-
come security has been accompanied by a loss of the original
perspective that viewed social insurance and public assistance as
elements of a single system. At its birth, that view had great influ-
ence. In 1934, President Roosevelt checked a congressional incli-
nation toward piecemeal enactment of income support legislation
by appointing a cabinet-level Committee on Economic Security to
develop a comprehensive program." That committee's propos-
als, modified by the President and Congress, became the Social
Security Act of 1935.12 The phriase "Social Security" has since
attached itself to the successor of but one of the programs
launched in 1935, Old Age Insurance. Its original use, however,
expressed the drafters' intention to provide protection, through a
variety of complementary measures, against the major sources of
economic distress for individuals and families: unemployment,
loss of a parent, and old age.' 3 This integrated approach ex-
tended to the two component programs that pertained particu-
larly to the elderly. Although quite different, these programs were
explicitly intended as complements to one another.
As the original programs went their separate ways and grew
enormously, the perspective fostering integration was lost. The
social insurance and public assistance programs for the elderly
continued to have profound impact on each other. But during the
period of their greatest growth, that impact consisted almost en-
tirely of each, in turn, being modified in light of imprecise as-
sumptions about the other. Little attention and even less effective
planning were devoted to the rationality, consistency or fairness of
the composite formed by the pair.
During the nation's struggle with welfare reform in the early
seventies, the need for a more comprehensive perspective was re-
discovered. One of the points on which President Nixon's ill-fated
Family Assistance Plan first ran aground in the Senate was its pat-
ent failure to deal adequately with problems of program over-
lap. 14 A subsequent set of studies and a report by the Subcom-
II See E. WITTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 3-9 (1962).
12 The Committee's report appears in Economic Security Act: Hearings on H.R. 4120 Be-
fore the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-59 (1935). For accounts of
how that report was prepared and how it fared in Congress, see A. ALTMEYER, supra note
1, at 3-42; E. WITTE, supra note 11, at 3-11.
13 See Martin, Welfare Law: The Problem of Terminology, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 793-94
(1975).
14 See V. BURKE & V. BURKE, NIXON'S GOOD DEED: WELFARE REFORM 152-58 (1974); R.
LEVY, T. LEwis & P. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE INDI-
VIDUAL 754-59 (1971).
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mittee on Fiscal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee of
Congress highlighted the urgent need to consider as a whole the
country's immense catalog of income support programs. 15 While
the present administration's welfare reform efforts have shown
signs of responding to that lesson, its version of "comprehensive-
ness" seems limited to the need-tested programs. As a conse-
quence, the resulting deliberations have largely missed the close rela-
tionship between social insurance and public assistance pro-
grams. 16 In any event, the reawakened attention to how income
programs complement (or frustrate) one another has yet to have a
large effect on our public income programs for the elderly. While
they distribute relatively generous amounts (compared either to
the past or to benefits for other population segments), they dis-
play the same qualities of irrationality, unfairness, and inefficiency
that led President Carter (and President Nixon before him) to call
for "comprehensive reform" of the "welfare system."
Present circumstances do, however, give considerable cause
for optimism. The recent substitution of SSI for OAA on the pub-
lic assistance side of the public income system for the elderly has
created a historically unique degree of institutional parallelism.
For the first time, the social insurance and public assistance pro-
grams serving a particular population segment are administered
by the same agency and financed at the same level of govern-
ment. 7 The basic eligibility and benefit rules for both programs
are now set by Congress, and the same congressional committees
exercise jurisdiction over both. In no other sector of the nation's
chaotic income maintenance system are the institutional factors so
favorable for program coordination.
The possibilities for such coordination are the final subject of
this Article. Before projecting future prospects, however, it un-
dertakes to survey the importance these programs have assumed
for elderly Americans. It then charts the erratic paths that our
pair of national income programs for the elderly have traced in
relation to each other from their birth in 1935 to their present
maturity and importance. Understanding this history is critical to
understanding the potential of the current situation. Many of the
most attractive present reforms require undoing effects that these
programs have had on each other in the past.
15 SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., INCOME SECURITY FOR
AMERICANS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PUBLIC WELFARE STUDY, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
16 See Martin, Is Social Security "Welfare"? CORNELL L.F., Feb. 1978, at 2.
17 See text accompanying notes 192-99 infra.
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I
THE PRESENT IMPORTANCE OF FEDERAL TRANSFER
PROGRAMS TO THE ELDERLY
A. The Need
The central economic fact of life for most older people is that
their earnings have decreased. Whether compared to the general
population or to the elderly of decades past, the current labor
force participation of the elderly is quite low.' Although some
people retire later than age sixty-five, they are a small minor-
ity.1 9 Increasing numbers, especially those with marginal skills
and deteriorating health, retire earlier. 20 Even for the elderly
who remain in the labor force, earnings tend to diminish because
aged workers generally work fewer weeks per year and fewer
hours per week than non-aged workers. 21 The elderly must
therefore find substitutes for what is the principal source of
economic security for the general population.22
18 For a discussion of causes, see A. MUNNELL, THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 62-73
(1977); Hollister, Income Maintenance Reform Issues with Respect to the Aged, in INCOME
MAINTENANCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO RESEARCH 71, 76-80 (1971). See also J.
KREPs, LIFETIME ALLOCATION OF WORK AND INCOME (1971).
19 In 1975, among those 65 and over, the labor force participation rates were only
21.7% for men and 8.3% for women. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR
HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS, 1976, Table 4, at 30. Comparable rates for those 55 to 64
were 75.8% and 41.0% in 1975. In 1967, the rates for those 65 and over were 27.1% and
9.6%. Id. Fifteen years earlier, in 1952, they were 42.6% and 9.1%. 1975 LABOR STATIS-
TICS, supra note 10, Table 4, at 35. For a focused look at trends in labor force participation
among older women, see McEaddy, Women in the Labor Force: The Later Years, MONTHLY
LAB. REV., Nov. 1975, at 17. Among women employed during the years just prior to 65,
the withdrawal rate is about the same as for men. See Bond, Retirement History Study's First
Four Years: Work, Health, and Living Arrangements, Soc. SEC. BULL., Dec. 1976, at 3, 5.
20 See ASPECTS OF AGING, supra note 7, at 51; Lauriat & Rabin, Men Who Claim Benefits
Before Age 65: Findings from the Survey of New Beneficiaries, 1968, SoC. SEC. BULL., Nov. 1970,
at 3.
21 See Bixby, Retirement Patterns in the United States: Research and Policy Interaction, Soc.
SEC. BULL., Aug. 1976, at 3, Table 2, at 4.
22 In 1975, earnings accounted for 86.2% of the aggregate income for male-headed
households of all ages and were the major source of income (75% or more) for 75.6% of
those households; for female-headed households the figures were 64.7% and 40.5%. HEW,
THE Low INCOME POPULATION: WHAT WE KNOw ABOUT IT-A STATISTICAL PROFILE 5-16
(Welfare Reform Analysis Series, Briefing Paper No. 3, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Low
INCOME POPULATION].
In the previous year, only 43.2% of the families headed by an individual 65 or over
received any earnings (compared to 84.6% of all families). BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME IN 1974 OF FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
Table 5, at 14-15, Table 6, at 16 (Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 101, 1976).
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Substitutes for lost earnings do exist-Social Security, pen-
sions (public and private), public assistance, and savings-but for
the majority of retired elderly, they fail to fill the gap completely.
Only a small, though growing, fraction of the elderly retire with-
out experiencing a serious reduction in available cash income. 23
And for many, retirement threatens economic security not just in
terms of prior levels of income, but in absolute terms as well.
These changes are usually permanent. 24 As a consequence,
the fairly frequent movement in and out of poverty status experi-
enced by the low-income population as a whole does not occur for
the elderly.25  Because of reduced earnings, the elderly are less
likely to experience income improvement due to economic growth
or the reduction of unemployment- forces that have a significant
beneficial effect on the number of lower-income households in
general.2"' In fact, economic expansion is likely to have a detri-
mental effect on the elderly since expansion is usually accom-
panied by inflation. The average person reaching age sixty-five
today has a life expectancy of about sixteen years.27  Over that
time any fixed income will be reduced by a quarter to a third if
the cost of living goes up as little as two percent a year.28
Because of earnings loss, the median money income of
households headed by a person sixty-five or over is slightly less
than fifty percent of that for all households, and only forty-five
percent of that enjoyed by households with a head between fifty-
five and sixty-four. 29  The rate of poverty (percentage with
23 See J. SCHULZ, G. CARRIN, H. KRUPP, M. PESCHKE, E. SCLAR & J. VAN STEENBERGE,
PROVIDING ADEQUATE RETIREMENT INCOME 10-23, 46 (1974); Fox, Work Status and Income
Change, 1968-72: Retirement History Study Preview, Soc. SEC. BULL., Dec. 1976, at 15, 26.
24 See Grad, New Retirees and the Stability of the Retirement Decision, SOC. SEC. BULL., Mar.
1977, at 3, 7-11.
2' See M. BARTH, G. CARCAGNO & J. PALMER, TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE INCOME SUPPORT
SYSTEM: PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS AND CHOICES 43-44 (1974); 1 J. MORGAN, K. DICKINSON, J.
DICKINSON, J. BENUS & G. DUNCAN, FIVE THOUSAND AMERICAN FAMILIES-PATTERNS OF
ECONOMIC PROGRESS 29 (1972).
Among the general population, a third or so of those who have poverty incomes rise
above the poverty line each year and are replaced by a comparable number. Low INCOME
POPULATION, supra note 22, at 5-21.
26 See Low INCOME POPULATION, supra note 22, at 5-7. See also R. PLOTNICK & F. SKID-
MORE, PROGRESS AGAINST POVERTY: A REVIEW OF THE 1964-1974 DECADE 122 (1975).
27 ASPECTS OF AGING, supra note 7, at 26.
28 See R. TILOVE, PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS 82 (1976).
21 See BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HOUSEHOLD MONEY INCOME IN
1975, Table 7, at 26-29 (Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 104, 1977). The
median figure for all households in 1975 was $11,800; those for households with heads 65
years or over and 55-64 were $5,585 and $12,485, respectively. Id. The 1970 census figures
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money income below the low-income level) is correspondingly
higher for the elderly than the population generally. 30  In 1970,
approximately one quarter of all persons sixty-five or over fell
below the poverty line.3
B. The Contribution of Public Income Programs
Without the economic support provided by the two national
public income programs for the elderly, these income figures
would be far worse. In 1972, public income support lifted nearly
two-thirds of the elderly who would otherwise have been below
the poverty income line above it.3 2  Half received enough Social
Security alone to rise above the poverty line.3 3  In 1974, the pov-
show a comparable relationship with median incomes of $9,596 for all families, $4,985 for
families with a head 65 or over, $2,488 for all unrelated individuals, and $1,813 for unre-
lated individuals 65 or over. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS,
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION, PART 1, UNITED STATES SUM, MARY, Section 2, Table
250, at 873-75 [hereinafter cited as POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS].
30 The 1970 census reported that 19.2% of families with heads 65 or over had incomes
below the poverty line, compared with 10.7% for all families. For unrelated individuals, the
percentages bore a similar relationship but were much higher-50.8% for individuals 65
and over, 37.1% for unrelated individuals generally. POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, supra
note 29, Section 2, Table 259, at 962.
" See id.
32 R. PLOTNICK & F. SKIDMORE, supra note 26, at 146-47. Another study puts the fiscal
year 1976 fraction at close to three-quarters. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CON-
GRESS, POVERTY STATUS OF FAMILIES UNDER ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF INCOME, Table 6,
at 12 (rev. ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as POVERTY STATUS].
Another indication of the importance of these programs, manifest during their recent
growth, is the dramatic reduction in the rate of poverty among the elderly. The economic
situation of the elderly was appreciably worse several years ago, when fewer elderly were
receiving Social Security, benefits were significantly lower, and public assistance (at that
time OAA) was less generous. As recently as 1967, the poverty rate among persons 65 and
over was 29.5%. By 1972 it had dropped to 18.6% and by 1974, to 15.7%. During the
same period the poverty rate for the population as a whole moved only from 14.2% to
11.6%. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION
BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL, 1974, Table 1, at 14 (Current Population Reports, Series P-60,
No. 102, 1976). See generally HEW, THE MEASURE OF POVERTY 125-26 (1976). For another
more comprehensive index of the impact of these programs, reduction of income inequal-
ity, see Danziger & Plotnick, Demographic Change, Government Transfers, and Income Distribu-
lion, MONTHLY'LAB. REV., Apr. 1977, at 7.
33 Because of the high incidence of pretransfer poverty among the elderly with a his-
tory of low earnings, roughly half of the dollars distributed in Social Security benefits go to
pretransfer poor. See Low INCOME POPULATION, supra note 22, Table 9, at 4-6. During
1972, over 80% of all poor households with heads 65 or over received Social Security; on
average it amounted to 80% of their total income. R. PLOTNICK & F. SKIDMORE, sura note
26, at 145, 149. Over 20% of poor elderly households received public assistance payments;
on average they accounted for one-half of those households' cash income. Id. at 145. As a
consequence of these improvements in public income support for the elderly poor, im-
provements that have not been matched by similar growth in public benefits for other
448
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erty rate among elderly persons was down to sixteen percent;
prior to counting income from public cash benefit programs,
34
principally Social Security and SSI, it was over fifty percent (see
Table 1).
TABLE 1
Poverty and Cash Transfers
to Elderly 1965-1975
Calendar % of Elderly Pre-Cash-Transfer Post-Cash-Trans- % of Post-
Year Receivinga Poverty Rateb fer Poverty Ratec  Cash-
Households Households Persons Popula- Transfer
OAS! OAAISSI With Head With Head 65 & lion as Poor Who
65 & Over Under 65 Over a Whole Are 65 & Over,
1965 75.2 11.7 * * * 17.3 *
1967 82.6 11.0 * * 29.5 14.2 24.5
1970 85.5 10.4 * * 24.6 12.6 22.9
1972 85.6 9.6 * * 18.6 11.9 19.0
1974 88.3 9.6 * * 15.7 11.6 16.2
1975 89.2 10.1 53 15 * * *
* - not available
Sources:
a Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, Table 23, at 57.
b BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION
BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL, 1974, Table 1, at 13-14 (Current Population Reports, Series
P-60, No. 102, 1976).
c HEW, THE LoW-INCOME POPULATION, Table 6, at 3-4 (1977).
Despite this success, public benefit programs have not done
terribly well for those just up the income scale, who also suffer
severe economic loss upon retirement. The median income for
elderly households remains just above the poverty line, far
below that of only slightly younger households."5 SSI ( like OAA
segments of the population (see Danziger & Plotnick, supra note 32, at 8-9), the elderly have
constituted a declining percentage of the low-income population. In 1967, 19.4% of the
poor were older people; by 1974, only 13.6%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL, 1974, Table 1, at
13 (Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 102, 1976).
34 In 1975, the pretransfer poverty rate (i.e., the poverty rate before counting govern-
ment income-transfer payments) among households headed by persons 65 and over was,
by one count, 53%. Low INCOME POPULATION, supra note 22, Table 6, at 3-4. See POVERTY
STATUS, supra note 32, Table 6, at 12 (59.9%); M. BARTH, G. CARCAGNO & J. PALMER, supra
note 25, Table 4, at 25 (54% for 1971).
"5 See note 29 supra. As a result of the clustering of elderly near the poverty line, using
a definition of poverty less stringent than the official measure adds relatively more elderly
than others to the low-income population. For example, doubling the present poverty in-
come level increases the poverty rate to 50.3% among the elderly, compared to 33.1%
among the population as a whole. And it increases the proportion of the poor who are
elderly from 13.6% to 15.3%. HEW, THE MEASURE OF POVERTY, Tables 19 & 20, at 113-14
(1976).
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before it) employs a need test that prevents assistance from reach-
ing much above the poverty line.31 Social Security provides mtich
lower returns on contribution to those likely to have incomes
above the poverty line, with the result that roughly half of its ben-
efits go to families who number among the pretransfer poor.37
Thus, one finds the elderly heavily clustered at income levels that
depend on these programs. In 1975, the median age of heads of
households in which the annual income was $2,000 to $2,999 or
$3,000 to $3,999 was over sixty-five, while for the next lower and
next higher incomes it was at least five years younger.38  The av-
erage Social Security benefit for a retired worker in 1975 fell
right in the middle of the first income range (roughly $2,500) and
average benefits for a family comprised of a retired worker and a
dependent spouse were in the second. 39  The manifest shortcom-
ings of public benefit programs for those elderly just above the
poverty line does not, however, undermine their value for this
group.
C. OASI, SSI and Other Important Sources for Low-Income Elderly
Looking more closely at which of the elderly get income from
particular sources, distinct patterns of income combination
emerge. In plotting those patterns, Social Security benefits, being
largest in amount and most comprehensive in coverage, furnish
the best starting point.40
'6 In 1975 the poverty line for an elderly individual was $2,572; for a couple it was
$3,232. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULA-
TION BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL: 1975, Table A-3, at 199 (Current Population Reports,
Series P-60, No. 106, 1977). The federal SSI annual payment level during the latter half of
that year was $1,892.40 for an individual and $2,839.20 for a couple. 40 Fed. Reg. 22,889
(1975).
The 1976 poverty figures were $2,720 and $3,417, respectively. BUREAU OF THE CEN-
SUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME AND POVERTY STATUS OF FAMILIES AND PER-
SONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1976, (ADVANCE REPORT), Table 15, at 20 (Current Population
Reports, Series P-60, No. 107, 1977). The SSI levels, as of July 1, 1976, were $2,013.60
and $3,021.60. 41 Fed. Reg. 19,999 (1976).
"' See Low INCOME POPULATION, supra note 22, Table 9, at 4-6. The pretransfer poor
are those considered poor when income from public benefit programs is ignored.
38 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HOUSEHOLD MONEY INCOME IN
1975, Table II, at 37 (Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 104, 1977).
'" See Current Operating Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., Mar. 1977, Table M-13, at 48.
10 During fiscal year 1976, the Social Security Program paid out cash benefits totaling
over sixty-two billion dollars to retired persons and their dependents, and to survivors of
deceased workers. Id., Table M-5, at 40.
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1. Social Security
At the end of 1976, ninety percent of the population sixty-
five and over was receiving Social Security cash benefits. 4 1
Seventy-four percent of all Social Security recipients were sixty-
two or over. 42  Social Security payments comprise more than
one-fourth of the aggregate income of those sixty-five or over,
approximately three-fourths for those with the lowest incomes. 43
For many recipients, Old-Age and Survivors Insurance 44
(OASI) benefits are the dominant source of income. In 1967,
OASI benefits comprised at least half of total income for 51% of
married couples with a head of the household sixty-five or over
receiving OASI and 65% of the nonmarried elderly; for 13% of
the married couples and 31% of the nonmarried elderly, OASI
benefits comprised 90% or more of income.4 "  In view of the
growth in Social Security benefit levels over the last ten years,
those percentages are almost certainly higher today.
2. Supplemental Security Income
Some of the elderly not receiving Social Security are simply
postponing benefits, having not yet "retired" as defined by the
program's earnings test of retirement. For the elderly who are
truly ineligible for Social Security and who do not have substantial
earnings or pensions (public or private),4" the crucial income
source is public assistance.47 Overall, public assistance accounts
41 Quarterly Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., Mar. 1977, Table Q-3, at 73.
42 Current Operating Statistics, supra note 39, Table M-14, at 49. Sixty-four percent of
Social Security recipients were 65 or older.
4' See Hollister, Social Mythology and Reform: Income Maintenance for the Aged, 415 ANNALS
19, Table 2, at 26 (1974).
44 In addition to OASI, "Social Security" includes disability and health insurance com-
ponents.
'- Note, Relative Importance of Income Sources of the Aged, Soc. SEC. BULL., Aug. 1973, at
37, 39.
Although its findings are now dated, the Social Security Administration's 1968 Survey
of the Aged furnishes the most comprehensive information on income sources for the
elderly. See Bixby, Income of People Aged 65 and Older: Overview from 1968 Survey of the Aged,
Soc. SEC. BULL., Apr. 1970, at 3.
46 Among those elderly ineligible for Social Security, roughly one-quarter receive some
other public pension (not including public assistance). The 1968 Survey of the Aged put
the figure at 24%-16% from the railroad retirement program, 9% from a government
employment pension. Bixby, supra note 45, Table 5, at 13. Only three percent receive
private pensions. Id.
17 During fiscal year 1976, combined federal and state SSI benefits totaled 2.6 billion
dollars. Compiled from Current Operating Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., Nov.-Dec. 1975, Table
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for less than five percent of the income of the elderly. 48  But
among the aged not receiving Social Security in 1967, twelve per-
cent of the married couples and forty-four percent of the non-
married persons received at least half their income from public
assistance.49  At that time, the principal public assistance program
for the elderly was OAA. As already noted, that grant-in-aid
program was replaced in January 1974 by a new program (SSI)
assuring minimum levels of cash income on a nationwide scale to
virtually all persons sixty-five and over. In addition to those basic
federal benefits, many states fund supplementary benefits. The
new public assistance combination has brought higher average
benefit levels.
Most Social Security beneficiaries do not meet the need test
for SSI payments. Nonetheless, SSI is an important supplement
for those whose Social Security benefits are at the bottom of the
scale. In June 1976, seventy percent of the elderly persons receiv-
ing SSI also received some Social Security.50
3. Other Income Sources of the Low-Income Elderly
While asset income, pensions and earnings are significant
sources of income to the elderly as a class, they are, almost by
definition, fairly insignificant to the elderly who depend on SSI
and OASI to provide a minimally adequate income. Compared to
those at higher Social Security benefit levels, those receiving
minimum Social Security benefits are less likely to receive income
from private pensions or assets but more likely to be receiving a
second public pension or public assistance. 51 Shifting to a related
M-22, at 59; Soc. SEC. BULL., Nov. 1976, Table M-22, at 70; Soc. SEC. BULL., Jan. 1977,
Table M-29, at 65. During the last month of that period, June 1976, 2.5 million elderly
persons received SSI payments. Derived from Current Operating Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL.,
Oct. 1976, Table M-22, at 74; Soc. SEC. BULL., Dec. 1976, Table M-31, at 60. That rep-
resented nearly one out of every ten persons sixty-five or over. Quarterly Statistics, supra
note 41, Table Q-3, at 73. During the mid- to late-sixties, a slightly higher percentage of
the elderly were receiving OAA, but benefits were significantly lower. See Table 1.
48 The 1970 census reports public assistance income (during 1969) to be 1.2% of the
aggregate income of all families headed by an individual 65 or over. POPULATION CHARAC-
TERISTICS, supra note 29, Section 2, Table 264, at 1016. The 1968 Survey of the Aged put
it at four percent for 1967. Bixby, supra note 45, at 14.
11 Note, supra note 45, Table 3, at 40.
50 Quarterly Statistics, supra note 41, Table Q-3, at 73. By contrast, fewer than three
percent received any earnings. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, HEW, EMPLOYMENT AND
EARNINGS: SSI BENEFICIARIES, DECEMBER 1975, Table 1, at 3 (Research and Statistics Note
No. 4, 1977).
51 Lauriat, Benefit Levels and Socio-economic Characteristics: Findings from the 1968 Survey of
the Aged, Soc. SEC. BULL., Aug. 1970, at 3, Table 3, at 8.
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reference point-total income 52 -one discovers that earnings and
income from assets are far less significant sources for lower-
income elderly. In addition, private pensions are available to an
insignificant number in this group of elderly and, quite naturally,
public assistance takes on much greater importance (see Table 2 &
TABLE 2
Importance of Various Income
Sources to Elderly
Families and Individuals
'Public
Public IPrivatePeso
Earnings OASI Assist. Assets Pension & Other
Percent Who Have I I
Particular Income I
Source (1974): a I
Families with Head 1
65 or Over
-Below Poverty Line 35.4% 85.3% 30.0% 1 29.6% 6.4%
-All Income Levels 51.8 90.5 9.9 I 69.5 21.9
Unrelated Individuals I
65 or Over I I
-Below Poverty Line 8.6 84.4 28.1 I 30.2 7.0
-All Income Levels 18.2 89.7 14.5 57.4 16.0
Percent of Aggregate I
Income That Comes From I
Specified Source (1972):b
Families with Head I
65 or Over
-Income Below $2,500 6% 72% 10% 6% 6%
-Income Above $2,500 47 26 1 14 I 12
Unrelated Individuals
65 or Over
-Income Below $2,000 2 75 11 5 1 7
-Income Above $2,000 19 36 2 28 I 15
Sources:
a BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION
BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL, 1974, Table H, at 9 (Current Population Reports, Series
P-60, No. 102, 1976).
b Hollister, Social Mythology and Reform: Income Maintenance for the Aged, 415 ANNALS 19,
Table 2, at 26 (1974).
52 A strong correlation exists between Social Security benefit level and total income. See
id. at 9-12. The principal class of low-level beneficiaries with higher incomes are those who
have accumulated a healthy pension through a career in public employment, uncovered by
Social Security, and have also acquired minimum Social Security benefits through a small
amount of additional private employment or a spouse's employment. See REPORTS OF THE
QUADRENNIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, H. Doc. No. 75, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess. 34-35 (1975); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 92d
CONG., 2d SEss., PUBLIC INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS: THE INCIDENCE OF MULTIPLE BEN-
EFITS AND ISSUES RAISED BY THEIR RECEIPT 26 (Studies in Public Welfare, Paper No. 1,
1972).
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FIGURE 3
Sources of Income of Aged Units
by Size of Income, 1967
MARRIED COUPLES NON-MARRIED PERSONS
0I I I1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Money Income in Dollars
Source: Bixby, Income of People Aged 65 and Older: Overview From 1968 Survey of the Aged,
Soc. SE C. BULL., April 1970, 3, at 17.
Figure 3). Somewhat surprisingly, the source most important to
those elderly who have managed to stay above the poverty line
(when compared to those below) is earnings. The poverty rate for
elderly families with a fully employed head is less than half that
for elderly families generally.5
3
4. Sources of Economic Security Generally Not Counted as Income
All official calculations of income and poverty are based on
cash income before taxes. As a result, they fail to measure improve-
ment in the economic condition of the elderly poor resulting from
public programs like Medicare, Medicaid, and Food Stamps. 54 A
53 Hollister, supra note 18, at 76-77.
'4 See 1975 ANN. Supp., supra note 7, Table 29, at 64, Table 141, at 164, Table 145, at
167, Table 176, at 187.
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recent study that placed a cash value on those benefits calculated
that they reduced the poverty rate in elderly households in fiscal
year 1976 to 6.1%; according to the same study, the figure for
elderly families counting only cash income was 16.7%.
The use of pre-tax income means that the official statistics do
not reflect the special tax advantages -sometimes termed "tax
subsidies" -enjoyed by the elderly. Since a tax burden does rest
on the low-income elderly, using pre-tax income apparently un-
derstates their economic hardship. But since the low-income el-
derly enjoy many more tax advantages than other portions of the
population, these figures actually overstate the relative hardship
of this age group. Thus, calculating after-tax (and after-in-kind
transfer) income further trims the percentage of the poor who are
elderly.5" Among the "tax subsidies" important to the elderly are
the exclusion of Social Security, SSI and other public benefits
from taxable income, the double personal exemption for those
sixty-five and over, and the Retirement Income Credit.5 7
In addition, while assets do not compare with earnings or
pensions as a major source of income for the elderly, the elderly
do have larger asset holdings than the rest of the population. 58
This is equally true of the low-income elderly vis- L-vis the younger
poor population. 59  Owner-occupied homes account for a sig-
nificant portion of these assets and are, in theory, a source of
reduced expenditure or imputed income. Liquid assets are also
significant, not only as an income source, but also as a source to
draw upon to augment income.60  Yet the liquid asset holdings of
" POVERTY STATUS, supra note 32, Table 6, at 12.
5f Id.
-7 Together they accounted for a "subsidy" of over $4 billion in fiscal 1974. FEDERAL
COUNCIL ON THE AGING, THE IMPACT OF THE TAX STRUCTURE ON THE ELDERLY 47 (1975).
58 J. PECHMAN, H. AARON & M. TAUSSIG, SOCIAL SECURITY: PERSPECTIVES FOR REFORM
15-17 (1968) [hereinafter cited as PECHMAN ET AL.]. They also have less debt. See Sherman,
Assets on the Threshold of Retirement, Soc. SEC. BULL., Aug. 1973, at 3, 10-11.
59 PECHMAN ET AL., supra note 58, at 18. The amount of asset holdings is, however,
closely related to income. See Murray, Homeownership and Financial Assets: Findings from the
1968 Survey of the Aged, Soc. SEC. BULL., Aug. 1972, at 3, 10, 17.
60 One study lumped assets of all forms together and assigned an annuity value based
upon the expected remaining lifetime of the head of the household.
[It was found that, whereas the aged comprised 33 percent of the total poverty
population when income alone was used as a measure of poverty, when an
income-net-worth measure was used the aged accounted for only 28 percent.
This reduction is a result both of the higher net worth of the aged and their
short-life span over which to annuitize that net worth.
Hollister, supra note 18, at 73. The study referred to is Weisbrod & Hansen, An Income-Net
Worth Approach to Measuring Economic Welfare, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 1315 (1968). See also
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the elderly are generally quite small, by any absolute measure, 61
and the owner-occupied house is often more a curse than a bless-
ing, at least economically.6 2  Thus, while asset holdings may not
substantially enrich the low-income elderly, they are significant
enough to be a matter of special concern in the framing of public
income programs. 3
D. When Benefits Begin
Any data or discussion based upon a definition of "elderly"
that arbitrarily lumps together all persons of a certain age will
naturally distort results. The characteristics of the population over
65 or over 62 or over 60 do not suddenly appear. Mandatory
retirement policies have affected a portion of the working popula-
tion, but for many of those approaching age 65, economic stress is
as severe as for those 65 and older (ignoring income programs
that make age 65 or 62 or 60 a threshold)."4 Nor does economic
stress remain constant past 65. The older the population segment,
the worse off it is in economic terms. Earnings are higher for
those just at 65 and immediately beyond than for those more
senior; medical problems increase in severity; and private pen-
sions based upon past earnings tend to lose substantial value over
time, due to inflation.
Yet most of the important income sources for the elderly-
especially the low-income elderly-do carry a specific age (or age
and period of employment) threshold. These thresholds lack con-
sistency, so transition from employment-supported living to re-
tirement will typically see different "retirement benefits" starting
Moon, The Economic Welfare of the Aged and Income Security Programs, in M. MOON & E.
SMOLENSKY, IMPROVING MEASURES OF ECONOMIC WELL-BEING 87, 88 (1977) ("Net worth
holdings spread over an average aged family's remaining expected lifetime would add as
much as 30 percent to its current money income each year.").
6 See Sherman, supra note 58, at 8-9. Half of the older people (ages 58-63) with finan-
cial assets (bank accounts, stocks, etc.) surveyed in 1969 had a total of less than $3,200. Id.
62 See Hollister, supra note 18, at 84-85.
63 For further discussion of this issue and an illustration of the complexity of quantify-
ing the addition of potential asset consumption to the economic well-being of the elderly,
see Moon, supra note 60, Tables 1 & 2, at 101-02; M. Moon & E. Smolensky, Income,
Economic Status, and Policy Toward the Aged 4-5 (Institute for Research on Poverty, Dis-
cussion Paper No. 350-76, 1976).
64 About 60% of the men and 80% of the women claiming retired-worker benefits for
the first time elect to have them begin before age 65, at a sacrifice of monthly benefit
amount. Many of those electing benefits before 65 are long-term unemployed. See 1975
ANN. SuPP., supra note 7, Table 59, at 91. See generally Lauriat & Rabin, supra note 20.
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at different times. Private and public employment pensions allow
benefits to start well before age sixty-five, occasionally without any
early-retirement reduction if the pensioner has enough prior serv-
ice. Increasingly, private plans allow retirement as early as age
fifty-five.65 At the extreme, only about ten percent of retired
military personnel now receiving pensions are sixty-five or
over.66  On the other hand, Social Security benefits are unavail-
able until age sixty-two 67 (sixty in the case of a widow or widower
of a deceased worker with coverage 68 ). And eligibility for SSI,
Medicaid and Medicare is limited to those sixty-five and over.69
To the many older persons who have not yet crossed these arbi-
trary age thresholds, significant economic hardship often results.
Nevertheless, by age sixty-five both Social Security and SSI
are available, augmented by three important non-cash ben-
efits-Medicare, Medicaid, and Food Stamps. Although these
programs have hot eradicated poverty among the population
sixty-five and over, they have focused benefits on the elderly in an
amount not matched for any other segment of the population.
II
THE ORIGINAL BLUEPRINT: THE
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT OF 1935
The Social Security and SSI programs, now so important to
the economic security of older Americans, trace directly back to
the Social Security Act of 1935. The framers of that landmark
legislation paid priority attention to the income needs of the el-
derly. 70 To meet those needs, the Act established a pair of
programs-Old Age Insurance (OAI) and Old Age Assistance
"' Skolnick, Private Pension Plans, 1950-74, Soc. SEC. BULL., June 1976, at 3, 7-9.
66 SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, HEW, BENEFITS AND BENEFICIARIES UNDER PUB-
LIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, CALENDAR YEAR 1975, at 2 (Research and Statistics
Note No. 17, 1976).
67 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)(2) (1976).
68 Id. § 402(e)(1)(B), (f)(1)(B).
69 See id. §§ 1382c(a)(1), 1395c, 1396a(10). In the case of all these public programs,
however, a person able to establish "disability" can start benefits earlier. Id.
70 See Soc. SEC. IN AMERICA, supra note 4, at 137-226; E. WITTE, supra note 11, at 27.
That attention derived in part from political pressure generated by the Townsend move-
ment. The Townsend plan, which remained a force to be reckoned with into the early
forties, offered the elderly immediate universal coverage and payments of $200 a month.
See M. SCHILTZ, supra note 3, at 40-44; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., THE TOWNSEND
CRUSADE (1936).
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(OAA). The decision to employ a two-component rather than
one-component system, though controversial at the time, set a pat-
tern that has proven highly durable.7 1
Old Age Insurance was federally administered and shaped as
a contributory plan; it paid benefits to those who, during their
working years, had made mandatory contributions in the form of
an earnings tax.7 2  This "insurance" scheme was expected ulti-
mately to develop into the "first line of defense against destitution
in old age." 7 3 Being contributory, however, the program was not
designed to commence paying out significant benefits for some
time. The original legislation provided for contributions to begin
January 1, 1937, and for monthly retirement payments to begin
no earlier than January 1, 1942.7
Until the "insurance" program hit its stride and, it was
thought, decreasingly thereafter, it would be essential to have a
noncontributory program that paid benefits to all those of retire-
ment age who lacked adequate resources. The program designed
to fill that need was Old Age Assistance, administered by the
states with partial federal support and only modest federal con-
trol. 75  By June 30, 1936, less than a year after enactment of the
Social Security Act, thirty-four states plus the District of Columbia
had OAA plans that qualified for federal support. By the end of
December 1937, all but one state (Virginia) had qualifying
plans. 76  In that month, OAA benefits reached over a million and
a half elderly persons. During 1937, federal, state, and local ex-
penditures for the program totaled $311 million.7 7
In short, for the initial post-enactment period, the allocation
of responsibility between the two programs established by the
1935 Act was clearcut. Of the two, only OAA was capable of re-
" The controversy centered on Old Age Insurance; Old Age Assistance was the most
popular feature of the Act. See E. WITTE, supra note 11, at 78-79, 93-95, 103.
72 See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 201-210, 49 Stat. 620. To anyone familiar
with the present statute, the simplicity of the 1935 legislation is overwhelming. The OAI
provisions take up less than four pages. They are usefully summarized in Soc. SEC. IN
AMERICA, supra note 4, at 222-26.
13 A. ALTMEYER, Supra note 1, at 16.
"' Soc. SEC. IN AMERICA, supra note 4, at 224-25. The 1939 amendments moved the
latter date up to January 1, 1940. A. ALTMEYER, supra note 1, at 91, 119, 278. See L.
MERIAM, RELIEF AND SOCIAL SECURITY 74-125 (1946).
7' See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 1-6, 49 Stat. 620; Soc. SEC. IN AMERICA,
supra note 4, at 189-97, 217-21.
7 SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, SOCIAL SECURITY YEARBOOK: 1939, at 12 (1940).
BUREAU OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, TABULAR SUMMARY
OF STATISTICS OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, Table 1, at 2 (1937).
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sponding to the large, immediate income need of the elderly
population. And OAA moved quite rapidly toward alleviating that
need.
The initial plan for the subsequent interaction of the pro-
grams was also quite clear but perhaps a bit naive. As the number
of those covered by OAI gradually increased, fewer would require
assistance. Years later, Arthur Altmeyer recalled:
I well remember ... the meeting [of the President's Committee
on Economic Security in 1934] when the staff exhibited a wall
chart .... [showing] two lines: one declining year by year,
which represented the declining number of old age assistance
recipients; the other rising year by year, which represented the
number of old age insurance beneficiaries. The two lines even-
tually crossed, demonstrating how the old age insurance system
would gradually liquidate the old age assistance system.7 8
Implicit in this blueprint was an assumption that most, if not
all, recipients of OAI would not need OAA, that once the insur-
ance program attained maturity it would furnish a minimally
adequate level of benefits to all recipients, at least measured
against the payment standards of state OAA programs.
78 A. ALTMEYER, supra note 1, at 26. While some apparently did refer to the "liquida-
tion of Old Age Assistance," the claims made by most supporters of the bill that became
the Social Security Act were less extreme. The Report of the Committee on Economic
Security stressed the need for the contributory OAI plan to hold down, not eliminate,
expenditure under noncontributory OAA:
Contributory annuitites [Old Age Insurance] can be expected in time to
carry the major, but under the plan we suggest, never the entire load.
... The estimates of the actuaries indicate that if a compulsory system of
contributory annuities is started by January 1, 1937, the Federal grants-in-aid to
the noncontributory pensions will by 1980 total less than 40 percent of the
amount they will reach by that date if a contributory system is not started.
Economic Security Act: Hearings on H.R. 4120 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 39, 42 (1935).
The executive director of the Committee, Edwin E. Witte, made it clear in testimony
before the House Ways and Means Committee that the reduced 1980 figure
will remain because the contributory system [embodied in the bill] will not
reach large groups in our population. If we can devise a method by which we
can bring into the contributory system the groups in the population who are
not now covered, the self-employed groups, then that cost can be further re-
duced.
Id. at 100-01.
When one compares such presentations with the recollections of congressmen unhappy
with rising welfare costs during the 1960's, one is led to conclude that the "withering away"
notion grew more simplistic with time. See G. STEINER, SOCIAL INSECURITY: THE POLITICS
OF WELFARE 26 (1966) (in a chapter entitled, "The Withering Away Fallacy").
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Forty-five years after [Old Age Insurance] becomes effec-
tive [1982!] persons whose wages from included employment
have averaged $50 a month will be eligible at age 65 to a life
income of $35 a month. In the absence of any radical increase
in costs of living this amount may often be sufficient to provide
for the person's needs without supplementary assistance from
State old-age assistance plans. The Federal old-age benefit sys-
tem will thus serve in the course of time to reduce materially
the extent of old-age dependency among wage earners and the
resulting burden on the State and Federal Governments for
charitable assistance. 9
The presumed adequacy of Old Age Insurance vis-ii-vis Old
Age Assistance, upon which this prediction rested, was substan-
tially enhanced by the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939.
These amendments added dependents and survivors benefits to
OAI (sweeping in large numbers of otherwise uncovered individ-
uals) and changed the formula for retirement benefits to one
based on average wages. At the same time, they increased the
limit for federal reimbursement of OAA to benefits totaling forty
dollars a month s.8  Although the amendments reduced the ben-
efit for the single retired worker whose wages averaged fifty dol-
lars a month over a forty-five year period (see the example
quoted above), 81 if that worker had a qualifying dependent wife,
79 Soc. SEC. IN AMERICA, supra note 4, at 224. The $35 a month figure is significant
because it exceeded by five dollars the maximum OAA benefit for which federal grant-in-
aid funds were available under the 1935 Act. Id. at 221. For most states, although not all,
that limit on federal reimbursement set the ceiling on OAA payment levels during the
early years of the program. In 1939, for example, 40 of 51 jurisdictions with approved
OAA plans had an explicit limit on monthly payments of $30 or less per month. SOCIAL
SECURITY BOARD, SOCIAL SECURITY YEARBOOK: 1939, at 158. See id. at 201, 204.
The $50 a month wage figure was well below the average for a manufacturing worker
in 1935. 1975 LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 10, Table 102, at 254. It approximated
monthly earnings at the minimum wage established by the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 (a 44 hour week at 25 cents an hour). See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676,
§§ 6(a)(1), 7(a)(1), 52 Stat. 1060.
80 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, sec. 102, § 3(a), 53 Stat. 1360. See
A. ALTMEYER, supra note 1, at 278; L. MERIAM, supra note 74, at 77-79; Martin, Social
Security Benefits for Spouses, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 789, 795-801 (1978). Significantly, the $40 a
month figure corresponded closely to the contemporary public's view of "the smallest in-
come that a single person over sixty [required] for a decent living." M. SCHILTZ, supra note
3, at 45.
81 The formula provided 40% of the average monthly wage up to the first $50 (plus
10% of the amount the average exceeded $50, up to $250), the resulting dollar amount to
be increased by one percent for each year of coverage. Social Security Act Amendments of
1939, ch. 666, sec. 201, § 209(e), 53 Stat. 1360. For the $50-a-month worker with 45 years,
this yielded a benefit of $29.00.
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her benefit increased the family's total to forty dollars a month.8 2
The amendments also improved the benefits of those with less
covered work before retirement. The fifty-dollar-a-month wage
earner retiring after ten years rather than forty-five, received only
$17.50 a month under the original schedule.8 3  The 1939
amendments increased the amount to twenty-two dollars a month
for a single individual, thirty-three dollars a month for a husband
and wife. 84
The original projections were soon upset, however, by a fac-
tor that the planners had left out of their calculations: a "radical
increase in the cost of living." Between 1940 and 1949, the con-
sumer price index rose roughly seventy percent.8 5 Wages rose
even more dramatically; the average weekly wage for manufactur-
ing workers more than doubled over the same period. 6 These
economic changes had a drastic effect on the relationship between
OAA and the 1939 successor to OAI-Old-Age and Survivors In-
surance (OASI). For two reasons, OASI proved structurally inca-
pable of dealing adequately with such levels of inflation without
further amendment of the benefit formula (which did not occur
until 1950). First, OASI's benefit formula rested primarily on av-
erage wages between January 1, 1937, and the date of attaining
age sixty-five.87 Consequently, it responded very sluggishly to
economic change as new waves of workers retired. Second, OASI
provided no mechanism to preserve the purchasing power of
benefits already awarded. In 1949, the average retirement benefit
was twenty-six dollars a month, only $3.40 more than in 1940.88
Consider again the worker who earned fifty dollars a month
in 1935. If his monthly wages kept pace with those of other work-
ers, they would have been sixty dollars in 1937 and $133.50 in
1948. If he retired at age sixty-five in 1949, his average monthly
82 The basic wife benefit was V/ the husband's retired-worker payment, but in the
example, a maximum (in this case 80% of the husband's monthly wage) would limit the two
to $40 a month. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, sec. 201, §§ 202(b),
203(a), 53 Stat. 1360. See generally L. MERIAM, supra note 74, at 93-107.
83 See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 202(a)(2), 49 Stat. 620; Soc. SEC. IN
AMiERICA, supra note 4, at 224.
84 See notes 81-82 supra.
85 See 1975 LABOR STATISTicS, supra note 10, Table 122, at 313.
8 See id., Table 102, at 254.
87 See note 81 supra.
88 1975 ANN. Supp., supra note 7, Table 84, at 121. The average benefit awarded newly
retired persons during that year was slightly higher, approximately $28.40 a month. Id.,
Table 62, at 93.
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pay would have been $91.60, producing, after twelve years of
covered employment, a monthly OASI benefit of $27.10-only
$4.70 a month higher than if his wages had held at fifty dollars a
month for the entire twelve year period. 89  These benefits
amount to a meager twenty percent of the worker's immediate
preretirement earnings (an index of adequacy now commonly
termed replacement rate).
Old Age Assistance, the noncontributory program, proved far
more responsive to the evident need for benefit increases through
the war and immediately thereafter. Both Congress and state
legislatures repeatedly raised the relevant benefit standards. In
1940, only .3% of OAA recipients had monthly benefits of more
than forty dollars a month, the limit for federal reimburse-
ment. 90 Nationwide, average OAA benefits were $20.14 a
month. 91 In September of 1949, thirty-four jurisdictions were
paying some of their OAA recipients more than the maximum for
federal reimbursement, 92 which by then stood at fifty dollars.93 In
ten states, including several with large OAA rolls- California,
Massachusetts, New York, and Washington -fifty percent or
more of the recipients had monthly payments larger than the fifty
dollar figure (and to that extent, completely financed by state and
local funds). Nationwide, 29.4% of OAA recipients had monthly
payments larger than the federal maximum; an additional 10.4%
received precisely fifty dollars a month.94 The average monthly
OAA benefit was $44.76, 95 almost identical to the maximum at-
tainable retirement benefit under OASI for a high-wage worker
retiring that year. 96
'9 The wage figures are calculated by indexing the $50-a-month figure against the av-
erage weekly earnings for a manufacturing worker. See 1975 LABOR STATISTICS, supra note
10, Table 102, at 254. Benefits responded somewhat more favorably to wage increases
below $50 a month. See note 81 supra.
90 Only eight states paid any OAA above the $40 level up to which the federal govern-
ment would share costs. However, 20 jurisdictions paid some benefits above the $30-a-
month maximum that had been in effect only the year before; 18 paid benefits at least up
to $40. SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, SOCIAL SECURITY YEARBOOK: 1940, at 297 (1941).
91 Id. at 294.
92 Annual Statistical Supplement, 1949, Soc. SEC. BULL., Sept. 1950, Table 43, at 58.
93 Congress raised the level of federal reimbursement to $45 a month as of October
1946 and to $50 a month as of October 1948. Social Security Act Amendments of 1946, ch.
951, sec. 501, § 3(a), 60 Stat. 978; Act of June 14, 1948, ch. 468, sec. 3, § 3(a), 62 Stat. 438.
94 Annual Statistical Supplement, 1949, supra note 92, Table 43, at 58.
95 Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1960, Table 126, at 91.
96 1975 ANN. SuPP., supra note 7, at 25.
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By 1949, the OAA programs of most states had standards of
need that exceeded the average level of OASI benefits. Indeed, a
majority had standards that exceeded the maximum attainable
OASI benefit.9 7  Thus, many Social Security recipients who had
no significant other income and were willing and able to meet
other state eligibility requirements for OAA 98 could obtain both
benefits. The patent inadequacy of OASI benefit levels placed
extra weight on OAA.
By December 1949, OAA reached 24.1% of the population
sixty-five and over, the broadest coverage in both percentage and
absolute numbers since the program began. 99 Although the
number of elderly individuals receiving retirement, dependents,
or survivors benefits under OASI continued to grow, by De-
cember 1949, the total was significantly below that for OAA. 100
And at least one out of ten OASI recipients received OAA as
well.' 01
The late forties proved critical for Old Age and Survivors In-
surance. A conservative Congress (1947-1948) not only resisted
President Truman's repeated urgings for improvements in cover-
age, but cut back slightly on the program's scope.' 02 In the Pres-
idential campaign of 1948, Social Security was an important issue.
The election of Truman and a Democratic Congress provided the
necessary ingredients for the first major program overhaul in
more than a decade-the Social Security Act Amendments of
1950.103
97 See Public Assistance Supplementation of the Income of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
Beneficiaries, Soc. SEC. BULL., Oct. 1949, at 10, 15.
98 Other state eligibility requirements for OAA included limited assets, willingness to
suffer a lien, and no children or other "responsible relatives" able to support them.
99 Compare Current Operating Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., Mar. 1950, Table 14, at 26,
Table 19, at 28 with Perkins, Trends in Recipient Rates for Old-Age Assistance, Soc. SEC. BULL.,
Oct. 1948, at 10.
100 There were 2,736,000 OAA recipients in December 1949. Annual Statistical Supple-
ment, 1949, supra note 92, Table 38, at 47. Retired wage-earners, dependent and surviving
elderly spouses and surviving parents receiving OASI benefits totaled 1,951,250. Id., Table
10, at 20.
101 Concurrent Receipt of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Public Assistance, Soc. SEC.
BULL., Aug. 1952, at 13; Public Assistance Supplementation of the Income of Old-Age and Sur-
vivors Insurance Beneficiaries, Soc. SEC. BULL., Oct. 1949, at 10.
102 See A. ALTMEYER, supra note 1, at 152-68; E. WITTE, SOCIAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVES
46 (1962).
103 Ch. 809, 64 Stat. 477. See A. ALTMEYER, supra note 1, at 163, 169-87.
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III
SOCIAL SECURITY ADJUSTED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF INFLATION:
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1950
The 1950 Social Security Act Amendments re-established the
priority originally intended for OASI by both expanding the eli-
gible population and nearly doubling benefit amounts.' 0 4  The
new benefit formula not only increased payments to those already
receiving OASI, but also set six quarters as the basis of coverage
for those at or near retirement age in 1950.105 This "new start"
provision both made it easier to qualify for benefits and permitted
benefits to be calculated using recent (and therefore, on average,
higher) earnings. Our hypothetical steadily employed low-wage
worker who retired in 1949 found his monthly check increased
from $27.10 to $50 as of September 1950.106 With a modest
period of covered employment after the amendments at wage
levels equal to or above the most recent assumed in our example,
he could end up with an even higher amount.'0 7
As soon as the amendments took effect, OAA rolls began to
decrease.' 0 8  By the end of February 1951, the number of elderly
OASI recipients surpassed the number of OAA recipients for the
first time.' 9 The gap has continued to grow ever since (see Fig-
104 The amendments extended coverage to self-employed persons, agricultural workers
and domestics, employees of nonprofit organizations, some federal, state, and local gov-
ernment employees and residents of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Social Security
Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, sec. 104(a), §§ 210, 211, 64 Stat. 477. As a result, the
fully insured worker population rose rapidly-from 40.1 million in 1950 to 59.8 million in
1951 and 71.0 million in 1954. 1975 ANN. Supp., supra note 7, Table 49, at 82. In 1950, 2.2
million workers aged 65 and over were eligible for OASI benefits. The figure was 3.1
million in 1951 and 4.8 million in 1954. Id., Table 51, at 84. See generally Cohen & Myers,
Social Security Act Amendments of 1950: A Summary and Legislative History, Soc. SEC. BULL.,
Oct. 1950, at 3; Hawkins, Old-Age Assistance Recipients: Reasons for Nonentitlement to Old-Age
and Survivors Insurance Benefits, Soc. SEC. BULL., July 1952, at 4.
105 Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, sec. 104(a), §§ 214, 215, 64 Stat.
477. For an explanation of the "quarters of coverage" concept, see text accompanying
notes 167-76 infra.
100 See Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, sec. 104(a), § 215, 64 Stat. 477.
107 See id.
108 See Annual Statistical Supplement, 1950, Soc. SEC. BULL., Sept. 1951, Table 37, at 44.
109 At the end of February 1951, there were a total of 2,800,864 recipients of retire-
ment, dependent or surviving elderly spouse, or surviving parent benefits under OASI.
Current Operating Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., June 1951, Table 6, at 26. The same month
there were 2,778,000 OAA recipients. Annual Statistical Supplement, 1951, Soc. SEC. BULL.,
Sept. 1952, Table 36, at 49.
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ure 1). Later in the 1950's, significant additional segments of the
population, including some important portions of the low-income
working population, were brought under OASI."0 And between
1950 and 1974, Congress liberalized the OASI benefit formula
eleven times."' These formula amendments prevented a recur-
rence of the serious devaluation of benefits that occurred prior to
1950.112 Social Security amendments in 1972 and 1977 put this
process on an automatic, administratively determined basis so that
benefit levels now increase to adjust for inflation without need for
legislative action. 113
The continuing congressional attention to the scope and
adequacy of OASI benefits since 1950, coupled with the pro-
gram's maturation, has resulted in an enormous growth in the
relative importance of Social Security. By December 1973, the eve
of the start-up of SSI, there were over nineteen million OASI
recipients age sixty-five and over (nearly ninety percent of that
population segment) compared with approximately 1.8 million
OAA recipients.1 4  Average retirement benefits that were, even
after the 1950 amendments, nearly identical to average OAA ben-
efits, climbed eventually to more than double the levels in the
need-based program (see Figure 4).
Despite the vigorous growth in OASI coverage and pay out,
however, OAA did not and could not wither away. Moreover, its
failure to develop nationwide with the same vigor as OASI had a
profound effect on the evolution of OASI.
110 Most important were the 1954 amendments which expanded coverage of farmers,
farm workers, and domestic workers. See Social Security Amendments of 1954, ch. 1206, §
101 (a), 68 Stat. 1052. See generally History of the Provisions of Old-Age, Survivors, Disability, and
Health Insurance, 1975 ANN. SuPP., supra note 7, at 15.
I See History of the Provisions of Old-Age, Survivors, Disability, and Health Insurance, 1975
ANN. SuPP., supra note 7, at 18-19, 24-25.
112 OASDI Benefits, Prices, and Wages: A Comparison, Soc. SEC. BULL., Aug. 1966, at 19;
Price, OASDHI Benefits, Price, and Wages: Effect of 1967 Benefit Increase, Soc. SEC. BULL.,
Dec. 1968, at 288; REPORTS OF THE QUADRENNIAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY,
H. Doc. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20 (1975).
'13 See Act of July 1, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-336, § 202(a)(1), 86 Stat. 406 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 415(i) (1976)); Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 201, 91
Stat. 1509 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 415(i) (West Supp. 1978)).
114 Current Operating Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., June 1974, Table M-14, at 37, Table
M-25, at 46; 1975 ANN. SuPP., supra note 7, Table 23, at 57.
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Average Monthly Benefits for
Social Security (OASI) and
Old Age Assistance (OAA)
Recipients
I
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sI
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Year
Source: Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1974, Table 76, at 112, Table
155, at 175.
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IV
WHY OAA DID NOT WITHER AWAY
The number of OAA recipients continued to drop from 1950
until 1973, but at nowhere near the pace at which OASI coverage
was expanding. The resistance of the OAA ranks to further sig-
nificant depletion stemmed not so much from the exclusion by
OASI of distinct pockets of the older population (perceived in
1935 as the primary limitation on the withering away of OAA) but
from the increasing overlap between the programs. For even
while OASI benefits were increasing so dramatically on average,
the program often did not pay enough at the bottom of the scale
to take recipients off OAA. From 1950 through 1973, OASI enti-
tlement among OAA recipients grew almost as rapidly as among
the elderly as a whole (see Figures 2 & 5). By 1967, over half the
OAA population also received OASI. The 1970 figure exceeded
sixty percent.1 15
The growth in OASI clearly had a dampening effect on
OAA, holding down both the number of recipients-many who
would otherwise have been eligible for OAA had their full income
needs, as defined by their state's program, met by OASI-and the
amount paid those who were on OAA rolls. During 1970, for
example, the roughly 1.2 million OAA recipients also on OASI
received OASI benefits approaching $1 billion. Without those
benefits, OAA expenditures (only $1.9 billion for 1970) would
have been much larger.'" Nevertheless, OASI had no realistic
chance to supplant the noncontributory program and, throughout
this period (1950-1973), the relationship between the two prog-
rams was haphazard at best.
' National Center for Social Statistics, Social & Rehabilitation Service, HEW, Concur-
rent Receipt of Public Assistance Money Payments and Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability
Insurance Cash Benefits by Persons Aged 65 or Over, 1948-1970 and February 1970
(NCSS Report G-2, 1970) (containing both the number of joint recipients and the average
of their OASI payments); 1975 ANN. SupP., supra note 7, Table 23, at 57. Among new
recipients, the percentages were higher still. In 1965, for example, 69% of the persons
added to OAA rolls were OASI beneficiaries, while the comparable figure for all OAA
recipients that year was 46%. See Characteristics of New, Old-Age Assistance Recipients, 1965,
Soc. SEC. BULL., July 1968, at 16, 16.
11' This estimate is based on February 1970 figures. See National Center for Social
Statistics, Social & Rehabilitation Service, HEW, Concurrent Receipt of Public Assistance
Money Payments and Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Cash Benefits by Per-
sons Aged 65 or Over, 1948-1970 and February 1970 (NCSS Report G-2, 1970).
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Also Receiving
Social Security
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Year
Source: Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, Table 23, at 57.
The lack of coordination stemmed from a difference in pro-
gram structure that seemed less important when OASI benefit
levels and coverage were more modest and when OAA and OASI
dealt with essentially distinct populations that overlapped only
minimally. The difference was simply this: the federal govern-
ment (Congress) set OASI benefit levels, but the states controlled
OAA levels. As Congress repeatedly increased OASI benefits
from 1950 through 1973, it occasionally adjusted the terms for
federal contribution to state OAA programs to induce or permit
similar increases. But having left to each state final authority over
[Vol. 64:437468
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FIGURE 6
Average Old Age Assistance
Payments for Several High-
and Several Low-Benefit
States, 1950-1973
1955 1960 1965 1970 1973
Sources: Current Operating Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., Mar. 1951, Table 14, at 34, and cor-
responding table in subsequent volumes, showing December figures for the pre-
ceding year, up through Soc. SEC. BULL., June 1974, Table M-27, at 48.
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its OAA benefit levels and related details, Congress lacked effec-
tive means to coordinate the two programs."17  The states thus
ultimately controlled the interplay between OASI and OAA. Be-
cause the states did not act in concert with Congress or with one
another, the interplay was incoherent.
A critical factor in the relationship between programs was the
enormous variation in OAA benefit levels among the states (see
Figure 6 & Table 3). Some states initially set levels that equaled or
exceeded the limits for federal support and tried subsequently to
keep pace with cost-of-living increases by setting and resetting
higher levels of support."' In California, for example, the aver-
age OAA payment surpassed the ceiling for federal financial sup-
port throughout the entire period from 1950 through 1965.119 At
the other extreme were states that set their OAA benefit levels at
very low figures and left them there despite increases in living
costs. In Mississippi, average OAA benefits peaked in 1971 at less
117 The original administration bill in 1935 had included a requirement that state OAA
plans furnish enough aid to an 'individual to assure "a reasonable subsistence compatible
with decency and health." It met severe hostility in both House and Senate and was re-
moved. In its place was put language that, by contrast, emphasized state fiscal concerns,
stating that the purpose of federal support was "to enable each State to furnish financial
assistance as far as practicable under the conditions in such State." A. ALTMEYER, supra note
1, at 35, 39, 59-60 (emphasis added). See M. DERTHICK, THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERAL
GRANTS: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN MASSACHUSETrs 43-45 (1970); E. WiTTE, supra note 11, at
143-45.
118 Massachusetts started out with payment levels pegged at the ceiling for federal reim-
bursement. Thus, from 1936 to 1942, the statute specified payment at the rate of "not less
than thirty dollars monthly for each recipient" ($50 for an eligible couple). In 1942, the
figure was raised to $40 for "individual[s] living outside a family group." Those living with
their family stayed at $30. MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. I18A, § I (Michie/Law. Co-op 1942). The
standards were stated as minimum levels, creating some dispute about their conformity
with federal insistence on a need-based formula. Eventually, the 1942 legislation provided
that income should be subtracted from such minimum payment levels. Id.
In 1943, the legislature authorized the state welfare department to review local
budgetary standards. Five years later, it specified that whenever living costs rose five per-
cent or more above the levels for 1947, those budgetary standards should be increased by
the same amount. Id. (Supp. 1948).
Additional specificity about the content of minimum payment standards and increases
in those standards followed in later years, but the basic scheme of administratively-set
budget standards, adjusted for increases in the cost of living (in 1965 the five percent
threshold was reduced to three percent) and subjected to no maximum, continued right up
to the replacement of OAA by SSI. See id. (1965).
For an excellent account of the political context in which these OAA benefit provisions
were enacted, see M. DERTHICK, supra note 117, at 53-70.
119 See Figure 6. In December 1964, California's average rate of OAA payment was
$97.11, nearly $30 above the federal reimbursement limit of $70. Current Operating Statis-
tics, Soc. SEC. BULL., Apr. 1965, Table 18, at 42.
California's OAA formula began as a simple and quite generous one by national stan-
470
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TABLE 3
Old Age Assistance and
Social Security Benefit Levels
Old Age Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Apr. July
Assistance (OAA) 1961 1963 1965 1967 1968 1969
OAA Payment Ala. $ 75.00 $ 75.00 $ 75.00 $ 82.00 $ 85.00 $ 88.00
to Elderly Cal. 95.00 106.00 151.00 151.00 162.00 165.00
Woman Living Colo. 107.00 110.00 114.00 120.00 124.00 128.00
in Rented Ky. 75.00 84.00 84.00 84.00 90.00 90.00
Quarters With Mass. 126.30 124.45 126.87 136.00 143.00 152.00'
No Other Miss. 40.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00 55.00
Income-Selected N.Y. 105.75 110.65 117.60 131A5 115.00 145.00
Statesa Va. 103.00 103.00 105.00 115.00 115.00 138.00
Average OAA Ala. $ 51.00 $ 60.80 $ 57.60 $ 60.70 $ 59.25 $ 61.85
Benefit Cal. 79.76 94.63 97.16 102.15 99.00 105.65
(Money Pay- Colo. 81.47 80.58 81.02 82.10 77.90 77.85
ments Only)- Ky. 50.18 53.43 50.23 56.10 53.70 53.70
Selected Mass. 69.53 68.41 69.73 80.10 80.65 88.95
States b Miss. 34.57 33.34 37.16 38.95 36.15 39.80
N.Y. 78.55 68.86 73.60 83.15 92.75 93.90
Va. 41.35 '41.76 45.11 53.05 54.90 61.00
Maximum Average Benefit After 1965 no limit for
for Which Federal state electing medicaid
Participation Available' S 65.00 $ 70.00 $ 70.00 formula. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1318 (1976)
Social Security
Minimum Benefitd S 33.00 $ 40.00 $ 44.00 $ 44.00 $ 55.00 $ 55.00
Average Retired- $ 74.04 $ 76.19 $ 77.57 $ 84.35 $ 85.37 $ 98.86
Worker Benefit'
Sources:
a Bureau of Family Services,'Social Security Administration, HEW, Monthly Cost Standards
for Basic Needs Used by States for Specified Types of Old-Age Assistance Cases and
Families Receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children, January 1961 (Dec. 1962)
and following reports in that series issued by successor agencies.
b Current Operating Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., May 1961, Table 8, at 39 and the equivalent
table for the appropriate period in later volumes.
c Notes to 42 U.S.C. § 303 (1976).
d History of the Provisions of Old-Age, Sunivors, Disability, and Health Insurance, Soc. SEC. BULL.-
ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, at 24.
e Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, Table 84, at 121 (averages for
the end of the preceding year).
dards. In 1937, the legislature specified that: "The amount of aid to which any applicant
shall be entitled shall be, when added to the income of the applicant from all other
sources, thirty-five dollars per month." 1937 Cal. Stats., ch. 369, at 1079. The standard was
raised to $40 in 1941, to $50 in 1945 and so on. By 1949, it stood at $75. See CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 2020, Legislative History (Deering 1952). In 1941 the basic formula was
modified slightly. For recipients with greater "actual need" the standard became a
maximum. 1941 Cal. Stats., ch. 764, at 2299. Under the modified formula, in theory, an
older person with "actual need" of $100 in 1949 and monthly income of $25 could receive
a full $75 payment.
In 1945, the legislature added a provision authorizing an automatic adjustment of the
state figures when the federal government clanged its reimbursement formula (up or
down). It was first triggered by the Social Security Act Amendments of 1946. See 8 Op.
CAL. Ax-r'v GEN. 106 (1946).
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than sixty dollars a month, 20 a figure significantly below Califor-
nia's average payments for 1950.121 In July 1970, OAA benefits
for an age-qualified single person with no other income ranged
from a low of sixty dollars a month in Mississippi to a high of
$200 a month in Alaska. 22  Patently, OAA failed to establish a
nationwide assured minimum income for the elderly.
As of 1957 (when the basic need standard was $89-up from the statutory figure of
$85 because of a four dollar increase in the federal share), the formula was modified in its
treatment of "actual need" above the basic figure. Additional amounts were to go only "to
persons with special needs arising because of circumstances and situations not common to
all recipients and not covered by the basic needs allowance." And a ceiling was placed
on the total-basic needs and special grants-that a recipient could claim. For 1957, that
ceiling was $105. "Actual need" in excess of that figure still counted, however, for recip-
ients with more than $16 of income. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 2020.002, Legislative
History (Deering Supp. 1959); tenBroek, Welfare in the 1957 Legislature, 46 CAL. L. REV.
331, 345-49 (1958). See also 32 OP,. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 114 (1958) (considering the relation-
ship of the automatic adjustment section to the new special-grant ceiling).
Except for automatic and legislated increases of the basic need figure and grant ceil-
ing, this formula remained intact until 1961. That year the legislature set those figures at
$100 and $165 respectively and enacted a cost-of-living clause that removed the need for
repeated amendments thereafter, committing the state to increases even though federal
reimbursement remained the same. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 2020 (Deering Supp.
1961).
From then until SSI replaced OAA at the beginning of 1974, that framework set OAA
levels in California. For a sense of the political context in which those developments oc-
curred, see J. PUTNAM, OLD AGE POLITICS IN CALIFORNIA; FROM RICHARDSON TO
REAGAN 49-142 (1970).
"2, See Figure 6. Throughout the lifetime of OAA, Alabama and Mississippi consistently
placed lowest among the states in average benefit levels. Both states achieved low averages
by means of payment maxima substantially below their standard of need. See text accom-
panying notes 127-32 infra. From 1950 through 1958, Mississippi's individual maximum
stayed at $30 a month. During most of the sixties, it rested at $50 a month. In 1971 it was
$70. See Commissioner of Public Welfare, Mississippi, Annual Report to the Governor
(1951-1958); Bureau of Family Services, SSA, HEW, Monthly Cost Standards for Basic
Needs Used by States for Specified Types of Old-Age Assistance Cases and Families Re-
ceiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children, January 1961, at 4 (1962) and following
reports in that series issued by successor agencies up to and including National Center for
Social Statistics, Social and Rehabilitation Service, HEW, OAA, and AFDC: Standards for
Basic Needs for Specified Types of Assistance Groups, March 1971 (NCSS Report D-2,
1971).
,21 California's average OAA payment in December 1950 was $67.13. Current Operating
Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., Mar. 1951, Table 14, at 34.
122 National Center for Social Statistics, Social and Rehabilitation Service, HEW, OAA
and AFDC: Standards for Basic Needs for Specified Types of Assistance Groups, July 1970
(NCSS Report D-2, 1970). Ten years earlier the range was only slightly less extreme. See
White, Meeting Financial Needs Under Old-Age Assistance, WELFARE IN REV., Dec. 1963, at 1.
A July 1972 survey conducted by the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of the Joint
Economic Committee of Congress reported a low of $75 a month in Mississippi and a high
of $239 a month in Nassau County, New York. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY OF
THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 93d CONG., 1st SEss., THE NEW SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY IN-
COME PROGRAM-IMPACT ON CURRENT BENEFITS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES 6 (Studies in Pub-
472
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During this long period, the only influence that Congress as-
serted over OAA payment levels was occasional fiscal encourage-
ment. From the start, the OAA legislation had set an outside limit
on payment levels toward which the federal government would
contribute. Raising that limit, as Congress did from time to time,
assisted high-benefit states in increasing payments. 123  In 1946,
the statutory formula became a two-step one, featuring a lower
range over which a more generous cost-sharing arrangement
applied. 12 4  Each time Congress raised that lower-range share or
lic Welfare, Paper No. 10, 1973) [hereinafter cited as IMPACT OF SSI]. The HEW reports
understate the high point of the range by calling for states that vary their standard accord-
ing to living costs (e.g., New York) to average.
12' The ceiling for federal participation rose from $50 a month per individual recipient,
where it stood in 1950, to $55 a month in 1952, and $60 a month in 1956. Social Security
Act Amendments of 1952, ch. 945, § 8, 66 Stat. 767; Social Security Amendments of 1956,
ch. 836, § 341, 70 Stat. 807.
In 1958, the ceiling was increased to $65 a month and converted to an average basis;
the federal government began to participate in the support of some OAA recipients at, say,
$75 a month so long as there were off-setting lower payments holding the state's average
below the ceiling. Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-840, § 501, 72 Stat.
1013.
Congress adjusted the ceiling again in 1960, 1961, 1962, and 1965. Those adjustments
brought it to $75 a month beginning January 1, 1966. They also added complicated provi-
sions for the treatment of medical vendor payments (eventually supplanted by Medicaid).
See 42 U.S.C. § 303 & note (1976).
No further adjustments have occurred, for another provision of the 1965 amendments
gave states an option that effectively removed the ceiling. It permitted states with a feder-
ally approved and funded Medicaid program to elect reimbursement for public assistance
expenditures (OAA, AFDC, etc.) in accordance with the "Federal medical assistance per-
centage" (see 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (1976)) "without regard to any maximum on the dollar
amounts per recipient." 42 U.S.C. § 1318 (1976).
California and other high-benefit states were among the first to elect such limitless
reimbursement (which required giving up the high rate of federal reimbursement of $31
on the first $37 average OAA per month for a flat percentage that in the wealthier states,
like New York and California, amounted to 50%). By 1971, 33 states had made that elec-
tion. See Assistance Payments Administration, Social and Rehabilitation Service, HEW,
Characteristics of State Public Assistance Plans Under the Social Security Act-General
Provisions: Eligibility, Assistance, Administration 134 (Public Assistance Report No. 50,
1971 ed., 1972).
124 Over the lower range, federal support was more generous in two ways. First, a grea-
ter percentage of total expenses was reimbursed (first 2/3, then 3/4, still later 4/5, and
ultimately 31/37), compared to a maximum reimbursement of 65% for the upper range (see
42 U.S.C. § 303 note (1976)). Second, over the lower range, states were always reimbursed
for average expenditures, so that payments above the limit to certain recipients could still
be reimbursed at the higher percentage if balanced by payments below the limit to others.
Thus, in December 1952, when the average OAA payment in Mississippi stood at $26.24,
nearly all of that state's OAA expenditures were federally reimbursed at the rate of 80%,
since it applied to up to $25.00 a month average payments.
In New York, to draw the contrast, the average stood at $56.94, only slightly above the
$55 limit on federal participation. That ceiling, however, applied not to New York's aver-
age but to payments to any particular individual receiving more than $55 a month, so a far
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the range to which it applied, both low- and high-benefit states
were able, if they wished, to increase benefits by a certain amount
at no additional cost. This "carrot" technique induced fairly wide-
spread OAA increases in 1952 and 1956, even among low-benefit
states. 12 5  But it was not sure-fire. States could always accept the
increase in federal reimbursement as an opportunity to cut back
on their own welfare expenditures rather than as a chance to in-
crease benefits at no cost.1 26
V
How OASI BENEFITS AFFECTED OAA
A. OASI Benefits Counted as Income
For joint recipients, the relationship between OAA and OASI
seemed, at first blush, straightforward. OAA carried a need-test
that required states in calculating need to "take into consideration
any other income ... of an individual claiming old-age assis-
tance." 127 The administering federal agency made it clear that
greater share was uncovered. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1952, ch. 945, § 8, 66
Stat. 767; Current Operating Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., Mar. 1953, Table 12, at 34. The limit
for federal participation over the higher range was not computed on the basis of average
payments until 1958. See note 123 supra.
125 See Initial Effects of the 1952 Amendments on Assistance Payments, SOC. SEC. BULL., Jan.
1953, at 17; Initial Effects of the 1956 Amendments on Public Assistance Money Payments, Soc.
SEC. BULL., May 1957, at 16.
126 It is also true that Congress did not itself always coordinate OASI increases and
adjustments in the OAA formula. Throughout the fifties and early sixties proposals for
OASI benefit improvements tended to come from the executive branch, while amendments
of the assistance reimbursement formula-being largely an expression of state fiscal
interests-typically originated in the Senate. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE, CON-
GRESS AND THE NATION: 1945-1964, at 1243-59 (1965); G. STEINER, supra note 78, at 50-59.
In October 1954, for example, Congress increased Social Security benefits by 13% or a
minimum of five dollars, but no change occurred in the federal OAA provisions. In
Alabama (which had the lowest average OAA payment in December 1953), the OASI in-
crease reduced OAA rolls by nearly one-quarter. Nationwide the drop was only two per-
cent, but the total reduction on the rolls in September 1954 translated into more than $2
million. See Effect of Increased OASI Benefits on Public Assistance, September-December 1954, Soc.
SEC. BULL., July 1955, at 11, Tables 1-3, at 11-13.
The 1954 increase in OASI benefits alone drew particular attention to the relationship
between the two types of benefits; even by 1954, in quite a number of states, between one
in four and one in three OAA recipients also received Social Security. White, Concurrent
Receipt of Public Assistance and Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, Soc. SEC. BULL., Aug. 1954,
at 12.
127 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(10)(A) (1976). This explicit requirement was added in 1939 to
remove any doubt. See A. ALTMEYER, supra note 1, at 105. The Social Security Board had
taken the view that the income requirement was implicit in the 1935 Act. See Social Se-
curity Board, Explanation of the Provisions of the Social Security Act Relative to Old-Age
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Social Security benefits were income (unearned income, insofar as
that distinction was important) and, as such, reduced-dollar for
dollar-the recipient's "need" under OAA.2 8 In most states, en-
titlement to OASI benefits would consequently reduce one's OAA
benefit dollar for dollar. This, in turn, meant that an increase in
OASI unmatched by a rise in the state's OAA standard failed to
produce a net increase in benefits for joint recipients.
The federal statute did not, however, require states to pay
100% of a recipient's "need," and some states chose not to. Al-
though the terminology varied, those states that did not pay 100%
of need employed one of two basic methods: (1) a maximum, pay-
ing 100% of need but only up to a certain figure; or (2) a percen-
tage reduction, paying all recipients a fixed fraction of their calcu-
lated need after counting other income, such as OASI. The
former method was more common.1 2 9
Assistance (1936). The Report of the House Ways and Means Committee on the 1939
amendments made specific reference to OASI: "This will make it clear that, regardless of
its nature or source, any income or resources will have to be considered, including ...
Federal benefit insurance payments under title II of the Social Security Act .... H.R. REP.
No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1939).
12' See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3), (6) (1973). Section 233.20(a)(4)(i) states in part: "All
income must be included such as social security or other benefits .... "
29 Other methods existed, but in terms of OAA-OASI interaction they amounted to
paying 100% of need. In one way or another, they took one need figure and reduced it to
create a lower "payment standard." Other income (OASI) was then subtracted from the
payment standard to determine OAA benefits. Like paying 100% of need, this approach
meant OASI benefits would reduce OAA dollar-for-dollar. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON Fis-
CAL POLICY OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 92d CONG., 2d SEss., HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC INCOME
TRANSFER PROGRAMS 109 (Studies in Public Welfare, Paper No. 2, 1972) [hereinafter cited
as PUBLIC INCOME TRANSFER].
A 1958 survey found only 13 states paying "full need" in OAA. Most states paying less
used a maximum. In some states, the maximum affected very few recipients; eight states
reported paying 99% or more of need despite a maximum. Only 10 states, by maximum or
otherwise, reduced average payments to 90% or less of need. See Perkins, Unmet Need in
Public Assistance, SOC. SEC. BULL., April 1960, at 3, 5-6.
After 1958, federal financial participation in OAA was limited on an average rather
than individual basis. See note 123 supra. The $60 a month limitation in effect just prior to
the change heavily influenced the maxima then in effect. Three states had maxima below
$60, 15 between $60 and $65, and six between $66 and $70. National Center for Social
Statistics, Social and Rehabilitation Service, HEW, State Maximums, Other Limitations, and
Effect of Federal Matching Provisions on Public Assistance Money Payments, July 1972, at
5 (NCSS Report D-3, Feb. 14, 1973).
Once the limit on federal financial participation shifted to an average basis, the
maximum lost some of its special attraction as a method for holding down OAA costs.
After 1958, fewer and fewer states employed maxima with significant effect. By July 1972,
only 18 states had maxima and only 10 had maxima of $105 a month or less. Id. at 4 &
Table 1.
The percentage reduction method of paying less than full need, although used by a
number of states for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), had very limited
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The precise relationship between OAA benefits and OASI
varied from state to state. Each state controlled two important var-
iables: the definition of "need" or minimum income level below
which an elderly person was entitled to OAA and the formula by
which income (and therefore OASI) affected the level of pay-
ments to a "needy" person. A state might have a definition of
need below the minimum level of OASI, so that the latter consti-
tuted the income floor for qualifying elderly; more commonly, the
OAA figure was higher. In either case, a state might reduce OAA
to an individual by one dollar for every dollar of OASI received;
ignore the first twenty or thirty dollars of OASI (the consequence
of a maximum); or reduce benefits in a constant ratio of less than
one to one (percentage reduction).
A state with a fair amount of overlap-i.e., having an OAA
need standard above the OASI minimum-might, consistent with
federal requirements, set up its OAA plan so that all joint recip-
ients with no other significant income would receive the same
cumulative benefits regardless of the relative proportions. Alter-
natively, a state could ensure that those receiving more OASI (but
also OAA) would receive higher cumulative benefits. In such a
case, the relationship could either be a constant one, increasing by
some fraction of the person's OASI amount (the result of percen-
tage reduction), or include a higher range over which cumulative
benefits remained level and a lower range over which each dollar
of OASI added a dollar to cumulative benefits (produced by a
maximum).1 30
use with OAA. In the early seventies, only Iowa and Puerto Rico had an OAA percentage
reduction formula. See id. Table 3; National Center for Social Statistics, Social and Rehabili-
tation Service, HEW, State Maximums and Other Methods of Limiting Money Payments to
Recipients of the Special Types of Public Assistance, October 1970, Table 3 (NCSS Report
D-3, 1971).
13' An example of the latter is furnished by Louisiana which in 1973 had a standard of
need of $150 (augmented for nearly one-third of the recipients by special needs amounts),
but a maximum payment for a single elderly person of $107. See Growth of the Supplemental
Security Income Program, Soc. SEc. BULL., May 1975, at 32, 35. As a result, a person receiv-
ing OAA and OASI, but no other income, had $43 of Social Security disregarded (or more
if the person had special needs). By casting a broad "eligibility" net, such a scheme brought
OAA to a high percentage of the elderly in the state and produced a high degree of
overlap with OASI. Thirty-one percent of those 65 and over in Louisiana were receiving
OAA in December 1973 and 21% were receiving both OAA and Social Security. Quarterly
Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., Dec. 1974, Table Q-4, at 81.
As of July 1972, 30% of the country's OAA recipients lived in states whose OAA
programs were structured so that receipt of OASI made an individual better off by at least
$20 a month. The remaining 70% lived where the increment was less; in the case of 27%,
five dollars or less. IMPACT OF SSI, supra note 122, at 12.
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Quite obviously, state control of OAA affected individual
benefit patterns-who got how much OAA and OASI at a par-
ticular time. But more important, the state formula also affected
the interplay between the programs over time. The effect on joint
recipients of an increase in OASI benefits thus depended upon
whether the state increased its OAA need figure (or maximum) by
an equivalent amount or, if not, how, under its benefit formula,
OASI increases affected OAA payments.
B. The Addition of Federal Requirements Designed to Encourage or En-
sure Pass-Through of OASI Increases (1965-1974)
This loss of control to the states is what brought the lack of
coordination between OAA and OASI most forcefully to congres-
sional attention: when it raised OASI benefits, Congress discov-
ered it could not count on corresponding increases in OAA. (Fis-
cal encouragement proved to be an insufficient lever.) States with
low OAA benefits and thus little overlap caused no concern. But
in states where the OAA standard of need surpassed the OASI
minimum benefit, an OASI increase could be nullified for joint
recipients, assuming the state paid most recipients 100% of their
need.13'
Such a case created twin sources of embarrassment for Con-
gress. First, the much-heralded increase had no impact for sig-
nificant numbers of OASI beneficiaries. Second, it resulted in fis-
cal relief for precisely the wrong states-those that had failed to
increase OAA standards. To the extent the additional OASI ben-
efits reduced joint recipients' "need" for OAA, those states could
reduce expenditures.' 32
"I1 Ironically, states that achieved low benefits through a payment maximum substan-
tially below their standard of need created little trouble of this sort. As long as the OASI
increase did not drop an individual's net need below that maximum, the increase was,
indeed, passed through to the recipient (even though the recipient's total of OAA and
OASI typically fell far below that available in states where OAA nullified the OASI in-
crease).
Thus, among the states, Mississippi-with a $30 maximum that remained unchanged
through the 1954 OASI benefit increase-had the fewest joint recipients experiencing an
offsetting OAA reduction because of that increase (53.8%). Effect of Increased OASI Benefits
on Public Assistance, September-December 1954, Soc. SEc. BULL., July 1955, at 11, Table 2, at
12.
132 The 1954 OASI benefit increase reduced monthly OAA expenditures in California
by $418,077, in Louisiana by $93,343, in Massachusetts by $127,322, and in Texas by
$136,464. Id. at 13. See G. STEINER, THE STATE OF WELFARE 12-13 (1971). For a discussion
of this problem, illustrated by the 1965 increases, see Reduction of Retirement Benefits Due to
Social Security Increases: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Employment and Retirement Incomes of the
Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967).
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Beginning in 1965, Congress enacted a series of minor ad-
justments to the OAA grant-in-aid requirements to deal with this
problem. In 1965, Congress accompanied a seven percent increase
in OASI with an addition to the Social Security Act authorizing
(but not compelling) state OAA programs to disregard five dollars
of income of any sort.1 33 Of course, a state could already disre-
gard five dollars and more by abandoning the pretense of paying
100% of need and imposing a maximum. 34
As a companion measure, Congress increased the federal
formula share so that a state could increase benefits $2.50 a
month at no additional state expense. 35  But for the first (and
last) time Congress limited the increased share to states that used
it to increase benefits. This was accomplished by a "maintenance
of effort" clause that reduced federal payments, under the new
formula, to the extent that the state public assistance expenditures
had not gone up over the base period of fiscal year 1965.136
In 1967, the Senate passed a bill that would have required
states to increase OAA payments an average of $7.50 a month per
recipient; in conference, an increase of the optional income-
disregard to $7.50 was substituted. 137  The 1967 amendments
also changed the "maintenance of effort" requirement, loosening
up the test and trimming a year and a half off its life (terminating
it at the end of fiscal year 1968).138
"' Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 403, § 2(a)(10)(A), 79
Stat. 286. The amendments also authorized, but did not require, disregard of lump-sum
OASI payments attributable to the retroactivity of the 1965 increase. Id. sec. 406.
1'4 See text accompanying notes 127-30 supra.
135 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, sec. 401, § 3(a)(1), 79 Stat.
286.
131 Id. sec. 405. The clause lumped all federally supported public assistance together so
that increased expenditures for AFDC could make up for a failure to increase OAA. See
generally Welfare Provisions of the 1965 Social Security Amendments: Brief Guide for State Action,
WELFARE IN REV., Sept. 1965, at 1, 4.
In 1962, President Kennedy had attempted such a result through "jawboning." While
signing the Social Security amendments of that year, which increased the federal share for
OAA sufficiently to permit a $4.20 a month increase, he said, "[it] would truly be a miscar-
riage of justice and a frustration of the legislative intent if these new Federal funds merely
replaced existing state funds." CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., Aug. 3, 1962, at 1314.
1"7 Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 213, 81 Stat. 821. See S.
REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 and CONF. REP. No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 27,
reprinted in [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2834, 3006-07, 3179, 3208-09.
138 Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 221, 81 Stat. 821. During
this period, at least one state, California, nearly adopted an OAA provision guaranteeing
pass-through of future OASI increases. In 1967 and 1968, the California legislature passed
a bill with that effect only to see Governor Reagan veto it. J. PUTNAM, supra note 119, at
137-38.
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The 1969 Tax Reform Act contained a mandatory provision
that dealt specifically with OASI increases. The provision required
each state OAA plan to achieve, in some fashion, a four dollar net
increase in cumulative benefits for those OAA recipients also re-
ceiving OASI in 1970, thereby "passing through" a Social Security
benefit increase.1 39 Congress required a similar four dollar pass-
through of Social Security increases in 1 97 2 .14 But overall, these
various measures constituted only minor limits on the broad state
discretion to set the terms of the relationship between OAA and
OASI.
VI
OASI's ASSUMPTION OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FUNCTIONS
Although the existence of OASI had only a modest effect on
the formal shape of OAA, the failure of OAA to assure a mini-
mally adequate income to the elderly throughout the country had
substantial impact on the structure of OASI. Early in its history,
Social Security began to compete with OAA for federal money
intended to meet the needs of the low-income elderly. OAA de-
pended on the states to set payment levels, but any addition to
OASI coverage or benefits became available nationwide. Particu-
larly since 1939, OASI has therefore developed along lines that
reflect two distinct and sometimes incompatible aims. It has re-
tained a strong mandatory social insurance character, forcing
workers to pay into a plan that, at the time of wage loss due to
retirement or death, assures them benefits related to past wages.
But it has also come to reflect a noncontributory "public assis-
tance" purpose, the desire to improve the economic situation of
those worst off among the elderly without regard to their past
contribution to the program.
During the early years when OASI payments reached rela-
tively few elderly, the inadequacies of OAA led some to propose
converting OASI to a two-tier system with the bottom tier-a uni-
versally available flat pension-replacing OAA.14 1 The growth in
both coverage and payout that followed the 1950 amendments,
however, eroded support for such a drastic measure. But the
"competition" between OASI and OAA continued and even inten-
,s" Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 1007, 83 Stat. 487.
140 Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §§ 304, 306, 86 Stat. 1329.
4, See A. ALTMEYER, supra note 1, at 181-82, 204-08.
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sified. 1 42  Between 1950 and 1972, Congress enacted a large
number of more limited adjustments to OASI to enhance its
coverage and adequacy as a minimum retirement income pro-
gram.
Despite initial doubts about President Eisenhower's views
on Social Security, by the end of 1953 his administration had
committed itself (as would those of Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson) to the primacy of the social insurance program as the
instrument of a national policy of preventing extreme need in old
age.143  His 1954 Social Security message included proposals for
expanding the program's coverage and benefits; many of these
proposals were subsequently enacted in the Social Security
Amendments of 1954.144 Eisenhower, though not his successors,
combined this commitment with a conviction that federal financial
participation in public assistance (including OAA) should, as a
corollary, decline.' 45
The next Social Security amendments bearing significantly on
the program's minimum income guarantee were part of a legisla-
tive package President Kennedy submitted to Congress in Feb-
ruary 1961.146 More than any prior or subsequent set of
amendments, they represented a single-minded adjustment of
OASI to enhance its effectiveness as an antipoverty weapon. The
original proposals appeared in the President's Message on
Economic Recovery and Growth, which recommended expansion
of AFDC, unemployment insurance, and OASI but no change in
142 The first version of the 1950 amendments that the Senate passed contained a provi-
sion that would have reduced the federal OAA share for joint recipients who became eligi-
ble for OASI after 1950. It was dropped in conference. See H.R. REP. No. 2771, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 117-18 (Conf. Rep.) reprinted in [1950] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3482,
3508; A. ALTMEYER, supra note 1, at 183-84.
' See A. ALTMEYER, supra note 1, at 238; CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE, CON-
GRESS AND THE NATION, 1945-1964, at 1246-47 (1965); G. STEINER, supra note 78, at 55-58.
144 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE, CONGRESS AND THE NATION, 1945-1964, at
1248-50 (1965).
1"- Eisenhower's 1958 Budget Message said, for example, that in light of the rapid ex-
pansion of the Social Security system and his "belief that the states should have greater
responsibility" in assisting the poor, he would propose "modernizing the formulas for Pub-
lic Assistance with a view to gradually reducing federal participation in its financing." Id. at
1252.
His successors did not share this view, but neither did they propose increases in
federal participation. During most of the post-1950 period the initiative for more generous
federal support for public assistance, including OAA, came from the Senate. See G.
STEINER, supra note 78, at 50-59.
107 CONG. REC. 1677 (1961).
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the adult grant-in-aid programs.147 The Message couched the
OASI changes in these terms:
The current softness of the economy underscores the in-
adequacy of social security benefits in relation to the needs of
many present beneficiaries. The average retired worker's ben-
efit is only $74 a month. A majority of these beneficiaries have
no other significant income. The basic principle of our social
insurance system is undermined when a substantial number of
retired individuals must seek public assistance or else subsist
below minimum standards of health and comfort. We must not
permit the benefits of retired workers and their families to lag
behind rises in living costs; we cannot decently exclude our
older population from the general advances in standards of liv-
ing enjoyed by employed workers. 148
Significantly, President Kennedy did not recommend an across-
the-board benefit increase, but instead submitted five proposals
designed to improve OASI for those in greatest need: (1) an in-
crease in the minimum benefit from $33 to $43 a month; (2) ex-
tension of actuarially reduced benefits to retired men beginning at
age sixty-two ("The plight of the older unemployed man is par-
ticularly serious in areas of chronic unemployment."); (3) liberali-
zation of the "insured" status test, to require only one quarter of
coverage for each four quarters of time since 1950 rather than
one per three; 149 (4) an increase in the aged widow's benefit from
75% to 85% of the deceased worker's primary insurance amount;
and (5) some softening of the "disability" test for disability insur-
ance. 15 1 Congress declined to pass the last proposal, but adopted
the others with slight modification-the minimum benefit was in-
creased only to forty dollars a month; the widow's percentage, to82.5%. 151
After 1961, Congress continued to employ such measures to
improve OASI's performance for the neediest elderly; numerous
subsequent amendments hurried the expansion of Social Security
coverage and payout. As OASI grew to reach 66%, then 75%, and
finally 90% of the sixty-five and over population, 15 2 the pressure
147 Id. at 1678-80.
148 Id. at 1679.
149 See text accompanying notes 167-75 infra.
ISO 107 CONG. REC. 1677, 1679-80 (1961). See Cohen & Mitchell, Social Security Amend-
ments of 1961: Summary and Legislative History, Soc. SEC. BULL., Sept. 1961, at 3.
5' Social Security Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-64, §§ 101, 104, 75 Stat. 131
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 415 (1976)).
I" See Figure 1.
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to embrace the remaining few who lacked the requisite slight con-
tact with covered employment (or family connection with a cov-
ered worker) grew stronger and stronger. The 1961 amendments
do, however, represent an unusually complete range of
techniques, and thus furnish a particularly useful base from which
to trace subsequent developments. The amendments contain four
distinct methods for strengthening Social Security vis-, -vis OAA.
A. Improvement of Benefits for Those with Limited Covered Employment
The 1961 increase in the minimum benefit to forty dollars a
month significantly boosted the lowest benefits on the Social Se-
curity scale in relation both to average benefits and to the
maximum available to a high-wage retired worker. 153  Through-
out the sixties, subsequent amendments increased the minimum at
a faster pace than benefits farther up the scale. 154  In addition to
these improvements at the very bottom, Congress repeatedly
made upward adjustments of the multipliers that converted aver-
age covered wages into benefit amounts, accentuating the "tilt" of
the benefit schedule in favor of the neediest. This "tilt" grew in-
creasingly more severe.' 55  Changes in the calculation of a work-
er's average wage also brought particular benefit to those with a
spotty employment history.' 56
B. Improvement of Widows Benefits
The 1961 increase of a widow's share of her husband's basic
benefit amount to 82.5% was similarly not an isolated event. Vari-
'5 In 1961, the average and maximum were, respectively, $75.65 and $120.00. 1975
ANN. Supp., supra note 7, at 25, Table 84, at 121.
' ' The minimum rose to $44 in 1956, $55 in 1968, $64 in 1970, and $70.40 in 1971. Id.
at 25. The minimum represented 27.5% of the maximum in 1960, 32.8% in 1963 (a con-
sequence of the 1961 amendments), 33.2% in 1966, and 34.3% in 1969 (all calculated in
terms of the retirement formula for men). Compared to the average male retirement ben-
efit, the minimum was 40.3% in 1960, 47.2% in 1963 (reflecting the 1961 amendments),
47.2% in 1966, and 49.6% in 1969. See id. at 25, Table 84, at 121.
In 1972, Congress established a new special minimum for those with many years of
coverage at low wages. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 101(b),
86 Stat. 1329 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 403(a)(5) (1976)).
"' From 1955 to 1975, the replacement rate (monthly benefits as a percentage of im-
mediate preretirement earnings) rose from 45 to 56 for a low-wage worker, 31 to 43 for a
worker with average earnings, while it held at roughly 30 throughout the period for a
worker with maximum taxable earnings. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY OF HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 95TH CONG., IST SEss., BACKGROUND MATERIALS FOR HEAR-
INGS ON SOCIAL SECURITY 16 (Comm. Print 1977).
1"6 See 1975 ANN. Supp., supra note 7, at 18.
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ous adjustments to the remarriage provisions increased the value
of those benefits through the late sixties.157  Then, in 1972, Con-
gress increased the widow's share to 100%.15 This change had
been pressed for several years on explicit "welfare" grounds. For
example, the influential book by Pechman, Aaron and Taussig,
Social Security: Perspectives for Reform, observed in 1968:
Abolition of the widow's "discount"-one of the major de-
ficiencies in the benefit structure- deserves high priority.
[There is no evidence] ... that women [require] significantly
less income than men to achieve a given living standard ....
Widows receive lower incomes, possess fewer assets, and are
even less capable of supplementing their benefits with earnings
than are other retired persons. As a welfare measure, an in-
crease in the widow's benefit to a full 100 percent of [her hus-
band's basic benefit amount] would more effectively aid the
poor, per dollar of added cost, than any other change in the
system, including a higher minimum benefit. The nonpayment
of taxes by the widow is clearly not a determining factor, since
she already receives 82.5 percent of the standard benefit on the
basis of her husband's earnings. 159
C. Relaxation of the Age Sixty-Five Test of Old Age
The original age threshold for both OAA and OASI was
sixty-five.' 60  The 1950. addition of federal support for need-
tested benefits to the permanently and totally disabled permitted
states to reach below sixty-five for those with severe medical prob-
lems.' 6 ' Social Security benefits for the disabled, added six years
157 See Martin, supra note 80, at 802-09.
"5 Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 102, 86 Stat. 1329
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402 (e)(2)(A) (1976)).
'59 PECHMAN ET AL., supra note 58, at 84.
160 Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 2, 3, 202, 49 Stat. 620. Prior to 1940, state
OAA plans could impose a more stringent age test, starting benefits as late as age 70. Id.
§ 2(b)(1).
'6 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-1355 (1976). States could, of course, reach below 65 if they
chose to do so without federal support. Colorado's OAA program paid (nonfederally
funded) benefits starting at age 60 for long-term residents of the state. See COLO. REV.
STAT. § 26-2-111(2)(II) (1973); F. BOND, R. BAKER, J. VIEG, L. PERRY, A. SCAFF & L. LEE,
OUR NEEDY AGED 133-34 (1954).
General assistance benefits in a few states, available without age limit, approached
OAA levels and thus reduced the importance of the latter's age threshold. Compare Puac
INCOME TRANSFER, supra note 129, at 332-33 with id. at 116.
States could also cover some persons under 65 in their OAA program by including
their needs in the check of a person 65 or over. Federal guidelines allowed the inclusion of
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later (initially limited to those fifty and over, but eventually with-
out regard to age), represented a similar adjustment on the social
insurance side. 1" For those unable to qualify as "disabled," how-
ever, sixty-five remained the age threshold for public assistance
throughout the history of OAA. By contrast, a series of amend-
ments, including the 1961 extension of retired-worker benefits to
men as early as age sixty-two, ended the age sixty-five definition
of "old age" for Social Security.'1 3  In 1965, Congress, showing
the special sensitivity to the problems of widows already noted,
reduced their age of eligibility still further to sixty. 1 4 (Seven
years later dependent widowers gained equivalent treatment." 5)
Those in greatest economic distress especially benefited from the
opportunity to draw benefits before age sixty-five, albeit at an "ac-
tuarially" reduced monthly rate.
1 16
D. Extension of Benefits to Retired Workers with Minimal Contribution
and Eventually to Individuals with No Contribution
The Social Security Act Amendments of 1939 tied OASI enti-
tlement to "insured" status,' which required a certain number of
"quarters of coverage." 168 Earning fifty dollars in covered wages
during a three month period chalked up a quarter of cover-
age.'" 9 Despite drastic changes in nearly all other parameters of
the system, the quarter of coverage remained the basis for enti-
the needs of a younger spouse or other "essential person" in the benefit calculations for an
OAA recipient. Most states made some use of that opportunity. See id. at 102.
162 Social Security Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, § 103, 70 Stat. 807 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 423 (1976)).
"i' Social Security Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-64, § 102, 75 Stat. 131 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1976)). Congress in 1956 had already dropped the age threshold for
women to 62. Social Security Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, § 102(a), 70 Stat. 807 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 402(a), (b), (e) (1976)).
114 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 307, 79 Stat. 286 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1)(B) (1976)).
6' Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 107, 86 Stat. 1329
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(1)(B) (1976)).
16 See Lauriat & Rabin, supra note 20.
167 Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, sec. 201, § 209(g), (h), 53 Stat.
1360. The benefits central to this study (retired-worker, wife, and widow) required "fully
insured" status. Id. sec. 201, § 202(a), (b), (d).
166 Id. sec. 201, § 2 09(g).
1651 See 42 U.S.C. § 413(a) (1976). The 1977 amendments finally changed the $50 figure.
As of January 1, 1978, $250 is required for a quarter of coverage (with the calculation
performed on an annual basis). After 1978, that figure is subject to an automatic yearly
adjustment. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, §§ 351, 352, 91 Stat.
1509 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 413(d) (West Supp. 1978)).
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tdement from 1939 on. Since wage rates climbed dramatically after
1939, leaving the wage test for counting a quarter at fifty dol-
lars' 1 0 significantly enhanced Social Security's coverage of part-
time and casual workers.
The 1950 amendments, reflecting a fresh start, provided re-
tirement benefits to all workers who had one quarter of coverage
for each two quarters that elapsed after 1950 and before the
quarter in which the individual became old enough for benefits,
subject, however, to a six-quarter minimum requirement. 17  In
1960, the required one quarter of coverage for two quarters of
time became one for three.1 72 The 1961 amendments, as already
noted, set the ratio at one for four. 73 Thus, a male worker who
turned sixty-five in 1962 needed only eleven quarters (two and
three-quarter years) since 1936 in which he earned fifty dollars or
more of covered wages. 17 4 A person seventy years old or older in
1962 could claim benefits with as few as six quarters (a year and
one-half). 7 5 Because the threshold carried such a low contribu-
tion requirement, excluding any elderly for failing to meet it
seemed patently arbitrary. This led to renewed efforts to
"blanket-in" all uncovered elderly.176
When the 1965 Social Security Amendments established Med-
icare, all persons attaining age sixty-five before 1968 became eli-
gible for it even though they failed to meet the regular "insured"
status requirements set for the program. 77 An amendment was
offered in the Senate that would, in like fashion, have granted the
minimum Social Security cash benefit to all persons seventy and
over, but it was tabled.' 78 The 1965 legislation did, however, es-
tablish a new class of benefits for certain people already in their
seventies who met a new, reduced "transitional insured status"
test. That test required as few as three quarters of coverage for
men who were seventy-six or over and women who were seventy-
three or over in 1965.J79 The following year, a Senate amend-
170 See note 169 supra.
171 Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, sec. 104(a), § 214(a)(2)(A), 64 Stat.
477.
172 Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, § 204(a), 74 Stat. 924.
173 Social Security Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-64, § 103(a), 75 Stat. 131.
174 One for each year (four quarters) from 1951 through 1961.
175 One for each year from 1951 through 1956 or the minimum of six.
176 See Cohen, Ball & Myers, Social Security Payments to Noninsured Persons, Soc. SEC.
BULL., Sept. 1966, at 3, 3-5.
177 42 U.S.C. § 426a(a) (1976).
178 Cohen, Ball & Myers, supra note 176, at 4.
179 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 103, 79 Stat. 286; Cohen
& Ball, Social Security Amendments of 1965: Summary and Legislative History, Soc. SEC. BULL.,
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ment to the Tax Adjustment Act of 1966 "blanketed-in" all per-
sons then seventy-two or over plus those who attained that age
before 1968.18' Reflecting the clear "public assistance" character
of these benefits, they, though not the "transitionally insured"
benefits of 1965, were funded out of general revenues.18 '
The eligibility provisions for these blatantly noncontributory
benefits demonstrated a novel degree of attention to the problems
of interface with government retirement pensions and OAA. Re-
ceipt of or eligibility for any government pension caused a reduc-
tion of this special class of Social Security benefits by an equal
amount (an early though limited recognition of the "double-
dipping" problem). 8 Receipt of any OAA rendered an individual
ineligible, but a potential recipient could reject OAA in favor of
the new benefits.' 8 3  The latter provision evidenced an intention
that the new benefits not be paid where they would provide no
advantage to the recipient-e.g., in a state where Social Security
benefits produced a dollar-for-dollar reduction of OAA-but
merely reduce state OAA expenditures.' 8 4
Sept. 1965, at 3, 15; S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15, reprinted in [1965] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1943, 1956. The new benefits were $35 a month for a retired
worker or widow, and $17.50 for the wife of a retired worker (80% of the minimum
benefit for those meeting the regular "fully insured" status test). Social Security Amend-
ments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 103, 79 Stat. 286. The minimum benefit was then $44
a month. 1975 ANN. SupP., supra note 7, at 25.
180 Tax Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-368, sec. 302(a), § 228(a), 80 Stat. 38
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 428 (1976)). See Cohen, Ball & Myers, supra note 176, at 5-9. For
such individuals, without regard to quarters of coverage, the Act established a special
monthly benefit of $35, plus $17.50 in the case of an eligible couple (the same amounts as
the 1965 provision awarded the "transitionally insured"). Tax Adjustment Act of 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-368, sec. 302(a), § 228(b), 80 Stat. 38 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 428 (1976)).
These amounts, like those for the "transitionally insured," were increased each time
the regular benefit schedule was adjusted. See 1975 ANN. Supp., supra note 7, at 22. Those
reaching 72 after 1967 had to have some quarters of coverage, the number increasing
gradually, so that by 1970 for women (1972 for men), it equalled the number that would
produce regular retired-worker benefits. Cohen, Ball & Myers, supra note 176, at 6.
I, See 42 U.S.C. § 428(g) (1976). In 1972, several members of the House Ways and
Means Committee expressed the view that at least a portion of the cost of the new special
minimum benefit established that year (see note 154 supra) should similarly be funded out
of general revenues. H.R. REs. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4989, 5363.
182 42 U.S.C. § 428(c) (1976).
18s Id. §428(d). See Cohen, Ball & Myers, supra note 176, at 5-6.
184 This provision had a strange effect on the distribution of the 1966 benefits. In low
OAA benefit states the new "special" Social Security benefits were more attractive than
OAA to many or perhaps most of those on the OAA rolls who met the more stringent age
test of the special Social Security benefits. But in high OAA benefit states, where the basic
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E. The Resulting Stress on OASI
The "transitionally insured" and "blanketing-in" provisions of
1965 and 1966 were one-time gestures of gradually dwindling
importance. 185  But the other "welfare" modifications of Social
Security traced in this section-including a comparatively gener-
ous minimum benefit paid to those making negligible contribu-
tions, a benefit formula that discriminated generally in favor of
those with lower levels of average earnings, and a system of de-
pendents and survivors benefits paid on behalf of those with qual-
ifying family members without additional contribution -grew into
major elements of the system.
Writing in 1968, Pechman, Aaron and Taussig observed:
The basic dilemma in considering reform of the social se-
curity system is that the United States has attempted to solve
two problems with one instrument-how to prevent destitution
among the aged poor and how to assure to people, having
adequate incomes before retirement, benefits that are related to
their previous standard of living. The earnings replacement
function calls for benefit payments without an income test.
Basic income support, on the other hand, can be carried out
most efficiently if payments are confined to households with
low income.
Two separate systems are needed to accomplish the two
functions at the lowest cost. The earnings replacement function
should continue to be performed by a social security system.
Social security would become strictly wage-related, with the re-
placement rate roughly the same at all earnings levels between
subsistence and the median earnings level. The income support
function should be transferred to a negative income tax systcm
payment exceeded the rates of $35 for an individual and $52.50 for a couple, the new
special benefits were more attractive than OAA only to those with other income that re-
duced their OAA benefits. In other words, in such states the provision discriminated in
favor of those OAA recipients in better financial shape. See PECHMAN ET AL., supra note 58,
at 108-09.
The enactment of SSI led many more of the dwindling population of potential
special-benefit recipients to elect public assistance at the cost of losing their special benefits.
Compare 1975 ANN. SuPP., supra note 7, Table 55, at 88, Table 116, at 143 with Soc. SEC.
BULL-ANNUAL STATISTCAL SUPPLEMENT, 1972, Table 104, at 119. Since SSI benefits are
more than twice as large (for a person with no other income) as the special benefits, the
remaining 162,000 recipients must, by SSI's criteria, be relatively non-needy. See Current
Operating Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., Mar. 1978, Table M-14, at 48.
'"s The blanketed-in beneficiaries totaled 728,577 at the end of 1967. Since then the
figure has declined every year-the consequence of few additions to the eligible group and
significant attrition through death. See 1975 ANN. SuPP., supra note 7, Table 55, at 88.
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or to a comprehensively reformed system of public assis-
tance. 88
Few could have predicted then how soon such a "comprehensively
reformed system of public assistance" (for the elderly at least)
would in fact come about. Pechman et al. judged prospects for
total reform "dim" over the "foreseeable future."'187
VII
WELFARE REFORM: THE REPLACEMENT OF OAA
Defying such predictions, in August of 1969, President Nixon
publicly launched a major program of welfare reform. Its central
feature was a proposed Family Assistance Plan (FAP) designed to
replace federal grants-in-aid to state programs of Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) with a purely federal benefit
program augmented by state supplements. Nixon's original ad-
dress devoted but one sentence to OAA and the other "adult
programs," 188 and from 1969 through 1972 nearly all attention
focused on FAP. Parallel reform of the other federally supported
state assistance programs-Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Blind,
and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled-received con-
tinuing, though low-level, attention as the political battles surged
over FAP.189 Although Congress ultimately failed to enact FAP,
186 PECHMAN ET AL., supra note 58, at 215. At an earlier point, the authors note:
The need for any minimum benefit would be greatly reduced, or would be
eliminated, if there were some method outside the social security system by
which the aged poor ... could be assured adequate income without the imposi-
tion of degrading application procedures. The old-age assistance program is
today the only major alternative for providing aid to the aged poor, but pay-
ments under it are far from adequate.
Id. at 93.
111 Id. at 217.
188 V. BURKE & V. BURKE, supra note 14, at 112-13.
18, The Nixon administration's initial reform bill, H.R. 14173, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., in-
troduced in October 1969, and the version passed by the House in 1970, H.R. 16311, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., both left the adult categories in state hands, supported, as before, by
federal grants-in-aid. Both bills would have imposed a nationwide minimum payment level
and uniform national eligibility standards. H.R. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reported out by the
House Ways and Means Committee in May 1971 and passed by the House on June 22,
1971, recast the adult programs in the same form as FAP-a federal benefit, federally
administered, with state supplements.
In June 1972, following its hearings on H.R. 1, the Senate Finance Committee an-
nounced several tentative points of agreement including dropping the new federal pro-
gram for the aged, blind, and disabled contained in Title II of the bill. Instead, the com-
mittee favored minimum benefit standards for state assistance programs for the adult
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in late 1972 it did vote to replace OAA and the other adult pro-
grams with a FAP-like scheme. 190 The new program, Supple-
mental Security Income (SSI), began operating in 1974. For the
first time, it established a national, minimum level of public assis-
tance for the elderly.19 1
categories (essentially the approach contained in President Nixon's original plan). But by
the time the committee reported out a bill on September 26, 1972, the federal program for
the adult categories, now named Supplemental Security Income, was back in. See generally
M. BOWLER, THE NIXON GUARANTEED INCOME PROPOSAL 123-58 (1974); SSI Study Group,
Report to the Commissioner of Social Security and the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare on the Supplemental Security Income Program 1-13 (Jan. 1976).
s90 Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 301, 86 Stat. 1329
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13 81-1383c (1976)). FAP stalled in the Senate twice after the
program passed the House:
SSI, however, was approved by the Senate because needy blind, aged, and dis-
abled adults were seen as more deserving of help than poor families, because it
did not cost as much or add as many new recipients to welfare rolls, and, most
important, because the attention of the Senate was focused almost completely
on the proposed programs for families. Describing action on the Senate floor,
[Senator] Ribicoff's legislative assistant said,
people were so concerned about Title IV (the family provisions) that no
one paid any attention to Title III (provisions pertaining to aged, blind,
and disabled adults). If SSI had been on its own it never would have
made it. Also, it passed because it looked like peanuts next to the family
programs.
A Senate Finance Committee staff member told a reporter that "During con-
ference, the SSI barely captured the conferees' attention."
M. BOWLER, supra note 189, at 147. Reviewing the same record, the Burkes conclude that
the controversy surrounding FAP "probably helped passage" of SSI:
The welfare revolution embodied in SSI escaped detection because few
read the plan, because few understood the welfare status quo well enough to
appreciate the plan; because man [sic] interpreted the triple endorsement of
Richard Nixon, Wilbur Mills, and Russell Long as a guarantee that the plan was
modest.
Except for the few persons who engineered it and for governors, who an-
ticipated savings from its federally paid floor for the aged, blind, and disabled,
few knew what was in Title III of H.R. 1.
V. BURKE & V. BURKE, supra note 14, at 197. All in all, a strange chain of events led to SSI;
as the Burkes observe:
Had Republican Nixon not won the presidency in 1968, America almost
surely would not have adopted a federal income guarantee for the aged in
1972. Not only was this revolutionary concept missing from the Democratic
agenda; the party's leaders and professionals were embarrassed by welfare and
loath even to discuss the matter.
Id. at 4.
"' The 1972 legislation set payment standards of $130 a month for an individual, $195
for a couple. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, sec. 301, § 1611 (b),
86 Star. 1329. Subsequent amendments brought the respective figures to $140 and $210
for the first half of 1974. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(b) note (1976). Such standards far surpassed
what the "low benefit' states were paying under OAA, but fell substantially below the
levels in "high benefit" states. For a comparison, see IMPACT OF SSI, supra note 122, at 53.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The original SSI legislation left to the states the question of
whether they would supplement the new federal benefits. Certain
very limited types of state or local benefits were discouraged by
the way benefits were calculated under the federal plan. No pub-
lic body is likely to assist an SSI recipient if the aid is counted as
income and produces an equivalent reduction in the federal ben-
efit. 192  But the SSI income definition excluded most local need-
tested benefits, which thus did not reduce SSI benefits. 93
Six months before the new program was to take effect, how-
ever, the Senate Finance Committee became concerned that many
recipients might be hurt by the change-over from SSI's grant-in-
aid predecessors .because of the states' unwillingness to supple-
ment SSI.' 94 This concern resulted in a new requirement that
states supplement the federal benefit to a level that would assure
each individual who was a recipient under one of the prior
categorical grant-in-aid programs the same level of support under
SSI. Congress imposed this requirement as a condition for the
states to continue receiving federal support for Medicaid.' 9 5
During the brief history of the federal SSI program, Con-
gress has increased benefit levels several times.' 9 Indeed, an
August 1974 amendment put SSI on the same automatic adjust-
ment basis as OASI, thereby explicitly coordinating the two pro-
grams and regularizing increases in benefit levels. 1 97  But each
time the federal SSI benefit went up, those states that by choice or
192 In-kind benefits furnished by state or local agencies were discouraged by SSI in this
fashion. Although supplementary "cash payments" furnished by local public bodies were
not counted as income in SSI benefit calculations, there was originally no comparable
exemption for in-kind benefits. A 1976 amendment removed the distinction. See Un-
employment Compensation Amendments of 1976, § 505(b), 90 Stat. 2667 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1382a(b)(6) (1976)).
193 See note 192 supra.
194 A reading of the one-day Senate Finance Committee hearing on the subject (June 19,
1973) raises doubts about the grounds for that concern. See Supplemental Security Income
Program: Hearing on the Need for Protecting Aged, Blind, and Disabled Welfare Recipients from
Suffering a Reduction in Benefits When the New Federal Supplemental Security Income Program
Becomes Effective in January 1974 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
195 Act of July 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-66, § 212(a), 87 Stat. 152. The requirement was
originally attached by the Senate Finance Committee as one of several Social Security
amendments to a bill (H.R. 8410, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)) that had already passed the
House, extending the federal debt limit. When the House resisted use of that vehicle, the
requirement was promptly (one day later) appended to H.R. 7445, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), "An Act to Amend the Renegotiation Act for Two Years and For other Purposes."
This time the House acquiesced.
196 See 42 U.S.C. § 1382 note (1976).
,97 Id. § 1382f.
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mandate were .supplementing SSI still retained the same option
that all states had under OAA: they could supplement to a
correspondingly higher benefit level, in tandem with the federal
increase, or stay at the same level. The latter choice effectively
denied recipients the federal increase. 198 In late 1976, Congress
severely limited this remaining area of state discretion with a fur-
ther Medicaid condition. To receive federal support for Medicaid
after June 30, 1977, states must continue to supplement SSI,
maintaining total SSI payments at their December 1976 level.' 99
Thus, to receive federal support for their Medicaid programs
states must maintain a supplementary benefit program at a steady
level of financing-a level which they may not reduce simply be-
cause the federal benefits have increased.
These revolutionary changes occurring between 1972 and
1976 removed virtually all the structural features that previously
blocked effective coordination of social insurance and public assis-
tance programs at the federal level.
VIII
THE NEW PARTNERSHIP: How OASI
AND SSI FIT TOGETHER
A. OASI
OASI's present broad coverage stems from eligibility rules
that qualify: (1) those who have worked a minimum period in
covered (and taxed) employment, 200 (2) the spouses of such work-
ers, 20' and (3) dependent parents of deceased covered work-
198 The OASI/SSI cost-of-living increase of June 1975 took at least 14,000 elderly off
state supplementation rolls. The following year's increase removed 35,000. Social Security in
Review, Soc. SEC. BULL., Nov., 1975, at 1, 1-2; Social Security in Review, Soc. SEC. BULL.,
Nov. 1976, at 1, 1-2.
199 Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-585, sec. 2, § 1618(a), 90 Stat. 2901 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1382g(a) (1976)).
200 That minimum period is one quarter of coverage for each year after 1950 and be-
fore the year in which the worker turns 62. (Workers who turn 21 after 1950 need count
only years after that.) A worker turning 62 in 1978 needed 27 quarters. In 1991, the
statutory maximum of 40 quarters (10 years) will be reached. See 42 U.S.C. § 414(a) (1976).
Prior to 1978, $50 of covered wages in a quarter produced a quarter of coverage. See text
accompanying note 169 supra. The 1977 Social Security Amendments shifted the test to an
annual one. For 1978, $250 of covered wages produced one quarter of coverage; $500,
two; $750, three; $1,000, four. Thereafter, the figures are subject to automatic adjustment
to reflect increases in wage levels. Pub. L. No. 95-216, secs. 351(c), 352(b), §§ 213(a)(2),
213(d), 91 Stat. 1509 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 413(a), (d)).
201 See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b), (c), (e), (f) (1976). See generally Martin, supra note 80.
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ers.2t12  Surviving spouses of deceased workers are entitled to
payments at age sixty; all other claimants must be sixty-two to re-
ceive benefits.2 "03
For any recipient, the monthly benefit depends upon at least
the following: the average covered earnings of the worker during'
a base period; 204 the age at which the recipient first claims ben-
efits; "5 and, prior to age seventy-two, the recipient's current
earnings if they are above a modest amount deemed consistent
with retirement (e.g., $3,000 in 1977).2 0 '  Earnings above that
figure reduce benefits fifty cents per dollar.20 7
Benefits are calculated in terms of a "primary insurance
amount" (PIA)-the monthly benefit a retired worker would re-
ceive if he had no excess earnings and first claimed benefits at age
sixty-five .208 Thus, a worker who claims benefits upon turning
sixty-two receives eighty percent of his (or her) PIA.20 9  The
spouse of a retired worker who claims a dependent's benefit at
22 See 42 U.S.C. .6 402(h) (1976).
211 Compare id. § 402(e), (f) with id. § 402(a), (b), (c), (h). Spouses who care for eligible
children of retired or deceased workers are eligible for benefits without regard to age. See
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) (extending such benefits to husbands
of deceased workers); 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(B), (g) (1976).
204 Only wages up to a certain figure are taxed and counted. The limit was $3,600 for
the years 1951-1954, $4,200 for 1955-1958, $4,800 for 1959-1965, and so on. In 1972, the
adjustments were put on an automatic formula basis, which, for example, produced a limit
of $16,500 for 1977. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 409, 430 (1976); History of the Provisions of Old-Age,
Survivors, Disability, and Health Insurance, 1975 ANN. SuPP., supra note 7, at 15, 32. The 1977
amendments further increased the amounts. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-216, sec. 103, § 230(c), 91 Stat. 1509 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 430(c) (West Supp.
1978)).
The worker's base period covers the years after 1950 and before age 62 (death in the
case of survivors benefits), with the lowest five years dropped. A person working beyond
his or her 62nd birthday can substitute later years for lower ones before 62. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 415(b) (1976).
205 See 42 U.S.C. § 4 02 (q)(1) (1976).
20, See id. § 403(b), (f); History of the Provisions of Old-Age, Survivors, Disability, and Health
Insurance, 1975 ANN. Supp., supra note 7, at 15, 29. The 1977 amendments dropped the
age at which the "excess earnings" reduction for OASI beneficiaries ceases from 72 to 70
(as of 1982) and increased the "exempt amount' for those 65 and over. As a result, there
are now two reduction formulae-one which applies to those under 65, another, more
generous, to those from 65 to 72 (65 to 70 beginning in 1982). See Social Security Amend-
ments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, §§ 301, 302, 91 Stat. 1509 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C.
§ 403).
207 See 42 U.S.C. § 403(f) (1976).
201 Id. § 402(a) ("Except as provided in [the reduction subsection], such individual's old-
age insurance benefit for any month shall be equal to his primary insurance amount ... ").
20 The reduction formula is 5/9 of one percent for each month prior to ag& 65, which,
for three years, totals 20%. Id. § 402(q)(1)(A).
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age sixty-five receives fifty percent of the worker's PIA. 2 10  A
surviving spouse who first receives benefits at sixty-five receives
100% of the deceased worker's PIA.2 11  A single surviving parent
receives 82.5%.212 And so on.
For those receiving beneffis prior to January 1979, PIAs are
determined from an annually-amended schedule according to the
worker's average covered earnings over a post-1950, preretire-
ment (or predeath) base period. 213  The Social Security Amend-
ments of 1977 established a new and more complicated method
for calculating a worker's PIA. The new formula necessitates con-
verting covered (and taxed) earnings to an indexed average de-
rived by comparing wage levels during the years of the worker's
base period to wage levels shortly before his retirement. 214
210 Id. § 402(b)(2), (c)(3). Drawing benefits at age 62 reduces the amount to 37.5%. The
reduction formula is 25/36 of one percent per month prior to age 65, which, for a three-
year period, totals 25% (of 50% of the PIA). Id. § 402(q)(1)(A).
2I Id. § 402(e)(2)(A), (f)(3)(A).
212 Id. § 402(h)(2)(A). If more than one parent is eligible, each receives 75% of the PIA.
Id. § 402(h)(2)(B).
213 See id. § 415(a), (i); 43 Fed. Reg. 20,867, 20,869-72 (1978).
OASI BENEFIT SCHEDULE-JUNE 1, 1978
Average
Monthly Earnings PIA
$76 or less $121.80
$100 156.70
200 222.40
250 251.80
300 278.10
350 307.10
400 336.00
Id. at 20,869-70.
214 See Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, sec. 201, § 215(a), (b),
91 Stat. 1509 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 415). The relationship between average in-
dexed earnings and PIAs that took effect in January 1979 is set forth below:
OASI BENEFIT SCHEDULE-JANUARY 1, 1979
Average Indexed
Monthly Earnings PIA
$135 or less $122.00
$150 135.00
200 168.40
250 184.40
300 200.40
350 216.40
400 232.40
500 264.40
600 296.40
700 328.40
800 360.40
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Both formulae include an initial bracket in which the return
of benefits to earnings is extremely high. The pre-1979 formula
(as adjusted for the latter half of 1978) provides a PIA of approx-
imately 156% of the first $110 of average monthly earnings (with
a minimum of $121.80).215 The new formula yields 90% on the
first $180 of average indexed monthly earnings (with essentially
the same minimum). 21" Beyond the first bracket, the return
drops off sharply-under the old formula to roughly 56% for the
next $290 of average monthly earnings; 211 under the new, to 32%
for average indexed monthly earnings in excess of $180 but not
more than $1,085.218 Additional brackets exist for high-income
workers, but the first two brackets are the ones pertinent to ben-
eficiaries for whom a minimally adequate income during old age,
and often before, is a serious problem. 21 9
The boundary between the first and second brackets is set
low enough to assure that any person with reasonably steady
employment during the program's base period will have substan-
tial earnings falling in the second bracket. As a result, the cumula-
tive return on earnings for a steadily employed low-wage worker
falls somewhere between the first and second bracket percentages.
Only those with spotty, low-wage employment in covered work fall
completely in the first bracket. The minimum benefit goes to in-
dividuals with only the barest employment experience; a person
claiming benefits at age sixty-two in January 1979 would receive
the minimum PIA only if his monthly earnings over the best
twenty-three years between 1951 and 1978 averaged seventy-six
dollars or less. 220
A steadily employed low-income worker is currently able to
retire with a PIA (under both the new and old formula) in the
Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, sec. 201, § 215(a), 91 Stat. 1509
(to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 415).
215 See 43 Fed. Reg. 20,867, 20,869 (1978); note 213 supra.
Between 1954 and 1979, the system responded to price and wage increases through
increases in the multipliers applied to a steadily increasing number of brackets, but the
initial brackets themselves remained constant. Thus, the PIA formula was 55% of the first
$110 in 1954, 71% in 1967, and 90% in 1971. History of the Provisions of Old-Age, Survivors,
Disability, and Health Insurance, 1975 ANN. Supp., supra note 7, at 15, 18-19.
216 See Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, sec. 201(a), § 215(a), 91
Stat. 1509 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 415); note 214 supra.
217 See 43 Fed. Reg. 20,867, 20,870 (1978).
218 Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, sec. 201(a), § 215(a), 91
Stat. 1509 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 415).
219 See Table 4.
220 See 42 U.S.C. § 415(b) (1976); 43 Fed. Reg. 20,867, 20,869 (1978).
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neighborhood of $240, approximately twice the minimum (see
Table 4). A spouse without equivalent retired-worker entitlement
is eligible for an additional benefit of approximately $120.221
TABLE 4
OASI Benefits of Two Hypothetical
Low-Income Workers About to Retire
Worker A Worker B
Steadily Employed Forty Employed at Annual
Hours a Week at the Earnings Equal to 112
Federal Minimum Wage the Median for Workers
(1951-1977)a of Same Age (1951-1977) b
Poverty
Line
Annual Earnings- 1959 ($1952) $2080 $1876
Illustrative Years, 1963 (2052) 2388 2105
Compared to Poverty 1969 (2458) 3328 2906
Line for Non- 1972 (2808) 3328 3355
Elderly Couplec 1976 (3830) 4784 4203
Average Monthly
Earnings 244 227
Primary Insurance Amount
(PIA)-
June 1, 1978 Schedule 246 239
Monthly Benefit if Begun at
Age 62 (80% of PIA) 197 191
Average Indexed
Monthly Earnings 432 387
PIA-Jan. 1, 1979
Schedule* 243 228
* A person eligible for benefits before 1984 is entitled to use the PIA from the June 1,
1978 schedule if higher, which it would be in both cases. Social Security Amendments of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, sec. 201, § 215(a)(4)(B), 91 Stat. 1509.
Sources:
a H.R. REP. No. 521, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEws 3201, 3218.
b Soc. SEC. BULL.-ANNUAL STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1975, Table 42, at 75.
c Id., Table 9, at 46.
221 42 U.S.C. § 402(b), (c) (1976). Benefits are, respectively, 20% and 25% lower than
these amounts if begun at 62 instead of 65. Id. § 402(q)(1)(A).
In late 1977, the average benefit to workers who had first claimed benefits at age 65
or later (and had therefore received at least 100% of their PIA) was $274; the average for
the 59.3% who started benefits between 62 and 65 (at a reduced rate) was $221. Quarterly
Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., June 1978, Table Q-4, at 74. Taken together, they represented
average monthly earnings in the neighborhood of $290. Compare the average earnings of
the low-income workers in Table 4. See id.; 42 Fed. Reg. 24,210, 24,211 (1977). Because
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While Social Security's "retirement test" may reasonably mea-
sure retirement for higher-income workers, it allows low-wage
workers to receive benefits without retiring. The workers used as
examples in Table 4 both made less than $400 a month in 1977
and qualified, at age sixty-two, for beginning benefits of roughly
$190. During 1977, a "retired" worker could earn up to $250 a
month while receiving full OASI benefits.12  Earnings of $400 a
month reduced benefits only $75.223 As a consequence, the low-
income worker can supplement continuing earnings with OASI.
Indeed, as long as such an individual is able to work, OASI per-
mits a higher standard of living than was possible before "retire-
ment." 224
B. SSI
SSI is available to all persons sixty-five and over who have
income and assets falling below the program's standard of need.
As of July 1, 1978, the standard for an individual was $189.40 of
monthly income and $1,500 in assets; 225 the comparable figures
for an eligible married couple were $284.10 and $2,250.226 Cer-
tain amounts of both earned and unearned income may be disre-
garded, and "assets" do not include such significant assets as the
applicant's home, automobile, and household furnishings. 7  Al-
though undoubtedly more could qualify, approximately ten per-
cent of the elderly receive some SSI.2 2 8
these averages pre-date the 6.5% increase of mid-1978, they understate the benefits avail-
able under the schedule shown in note 213 (supra) by at least that amount. The benefits
paid new retired-worker claimants, based on more recent and therefore, on average,
higher earnings, exceeded the average benefits for all retired-worker beneficiaries. The
difference amounted to 5%. See Current Operating Statistics, supra note 184, Table M-13, at
47. The average payments during late 1977 for dependent wives and husbands and surviv-
ing widows and widowers (including those electing benefits before age 65) were $123 and
$222, respectively. Id.
• See 42 U.S.C. § 403(f) (1976).
22, The reduction amounted to 50 cents for each dollar over $250 a month. See id.
§ 403(b), (f).
224 Using the above figures, the individual would receive $400 in earnings and $115 in
OASI a month.
22 43 Fed. Reg. 20,867, 20,868 (1978). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382(a), 1382a, 1382b (1976).
226 43 Fed. Reg. 20,867, 20,868 (1978).
227 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382(a), 1382a, 1382b (1976).
228 Quarterly Statistics, Soc. SEc. BULL., Mar. 1978, Table Q-3, at 77. On the gap between
the number eligible and the number receiving benefits, see Note, Outreach: Bringing the
Eligible Into Federal Assistance Programs, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 1093, 1108-10 (1977).
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In one sense, SSI has supplanted the minimum income assur-
ance function that OASI had been previously stretched to fill.
Those receiving Social Security benefits based on a low earnings
record-their own or that of a spouse or child-are now entitled
to a greater level of support under SSI. The SSI payment for an
individual is fifty-six percent higher than the minimum Social
Security PIA 229 and only slightly below the retired-worker benefit
a steadily employed minimum-wage worker receives upon electing
benefits at age sixty-two (see Tables 4 & 5).
In another sense, however, SSI has only supplemented Social
Security for recipients at lower benefit levels. To remain eligible
for SSI, persons also eligible for OASI benefits must apply for
them. 230  Approximately seventy percent of the elderly who re-
ceive SSI also receive Social Security. 23' Joint recipients get un-
diminished OASI benefits, with only enough SSI to bring them
up to that program's standard of need, plus a small bonus created
by its disregarding a small amount of OASI. SSI thus forces
primary reliance on OASI. Currently, Social Security payments to
elderly SSI recipients slightly exceed their total SSI payments.232
C. The OASI-SSI Relationship
When received, OASI benefits are treated as unearned in-
come that produces a dollar-for-dollar reduction in SSI payments
after the first twenty dollars per month.233  (The relationship be-
tween the two benefits is shown in Table 5 and Figure 7.) For the
income range in which SSI eligibility exists, therefore, eligibility
for OASI merely adds twenty dollars to the total income of an
individual or couple.234 This increment is the same whether the
22, See 43 Fed. Reg. 20,867, 20,869 (1978); text accompanying note 225 supra. If one
assumes OASI benefits are begun at age 62 (see text accompanying note 209 supra), SSI is
94% higher than the minimum OASI retired-worker benefit.
20 Those eligible for OASI benefits or similar payments must apply for them within 30
days after receiving a notice to that effect, or they become ineligible for SSI. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382(e) (2) (1976).
231 1975 ANN. SUPP., supra note 7, Table 23, at 57.
232 For December 1977, the 70% of aged SSI recipients with Social Security benefits
received a total of approximately $210,508,000 of OASI. SSI payments (including state
supplements) to all aged recipients that month were only approximately $199,340,000. See
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, HEW, PROGRAM
AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY BENEFICIARIES, DECEMBER
1977, Table B, at 5, Table F, at 9 (1978).
233 The SSI benefit formula ignores $20 of income of any type. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382a(a)(2)(B), (b)(2)(A) (1976).
234 It adds nothing if there are other sources of income.
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wage-earner's prior average earnings were the absolute minimum
consistent with insured status (fifty dollars a quarter for twenty-
seven quarters-six and three-quarter yeas-for an individual
turning sixty-two in 1973)235 or were as high as $267 a month.
Between those amounts, past employment and the related pay-
ment of Social Security tax (FICA) affect only the mix of OASI
and SSI in the recipient's total income during a period when both
are available. The steadily employed low-wage worker and the
person with minimal covered employment receive identical total
benefits.
TABLE 5
Cumulative Benefits-OASI and SSI
Average Monthly
No State Supplement OASI Earnings (AME) SSI Total
Individual $ 0.00 $189.40 $189.40
97.40 ($76 or less, if benefits 112.00 209.40
claimed at 62)
121.80 ($76 or less, if benefits 87.60 209.40
claimed at 65)
209.40 ($178 if benefits claimed 0.00 209.40
at 65, $267, if at 62)a
Couple with Only
One Covered Worker 0.00 284.10 284.10
143.10 ($76 or less, if benefits 161.00 304.10
claimed at 62)
182.70 ($76 or less, if benefits 121.40 '304.10
claimed at 65)
304.10 ($165 if benefits claimed 0.00 304.10
at 65, $263, if at 62) b
AME
(assuming bene- State
High State Supplement OASI fits claimed at 62) SSI Supp. Total
Individual $ 0.00 $189.40 $100.00 $289.40
209.40 ($267) 0.00 100.00 309.40
309.40 ($312)c 0.00 0.00 309.40
Couple with Only
One Covered Worker 0.00 284.10 150.00 434.10
304.10 ($263) 0.00 150.00 454.10
454.10 ($496)d 0.00 0.00 454.10
Sources: 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a)(2)(B), (b)(2)(A) (1976); 43 Fed. Reg. 20,867, 20,868-69 (1978).
a $178 AME = $2,136 average annual earnings; $267 AME = $3,204 average annual earnings.
b $165 AME = $1,980 average annual earnings; $263 AME = $3,156 average annual earnings.
c $312 AME = $3,744 average annual earnings.
d $496 AME = $5,952 average annual earnings.
235 See note 200 supra.
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The OASI-SSI relationship sketched so far represents the
situation for individuals to whom both programs are potentially
available. But both may not be available. While the programs
focus on much the same population, a number of significant dis-
crepancies exist in their coverage.
FIGuRE 7
Relationship of Total Benefits to
OASI Benefit Level
350-
300-* ,• Total of SS1, State Supplement
and OASI
/
I"
Cu /250 -
- 200- Total of SSI and OASI
M
- 150-
100-
Effect on SSI alone
50-
20 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
OASI Benefits in Dollars
1. Age
Except in the case of disability, for which Social Security and
SSI provide specially, strict age thresholds define access to the two
programs. At present, there is a three to five year discrepancy as
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to when that threshold is reached. A widow or widower who
claims OASI on the account of a deceased wage-earner can obtain
benefits as early as age sixty; in all other OASI cases, the age
threshold is sixty-two. 2 3" Reflecting the contributory or "insur-
ance" character of the program, a benefit reduction formula ad-
justs the monthly payment according to the age at which the
recipient begins benefits. -37
In contrast, SSI has an absolute age sixty-five threshold.23 8
As a consequence, the low-income (low-OASI benefit) individual
or couple draws three to five years of unsupplemented OASI (at a
reduced monthly amount, because drawn ahead of the "normal"
retirement age of sixty-five). But once SSI is available, it cancels
out the OASI "early retirement" benefit reduction.
2. Marriage
When a married couple with disparate ages 239 moves across
these thresholds, th.e results seem even more discrepant because
of another difference in the programs: their treatment of mar-
riage at benefit time.
SSI has an expansive definition of marriage and a benefit
scheme that treats a married couple household as an economic
unit. This affects both eligibility (because of income imputation)
and the definition of "need." .240 Eligibility for each partner
nevertheless still depends on age.2 41  Under OASI, marital status
can provide additional benefits without regard to whether the
spouses still live together. 42 Thus, OASI provides a bonus for
236 See note 203 and accompanying text supra.
237 See 42 U.S.C. § 402(q)(1)(A) (1976).
238 Id. § 1382c(a)(1)(A).
13: Most married couples approaching retirement are three or more years apart in age.
Typically the husband is older. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PERSPEC-
TIVES ON AMERICAN HUSBANDS AND WIVES, Table 4, at 5 (Current Population Reports,
Series P-23, No. 77, 1978).
240 SSI treats the married couple household differently from, for example, a brother-
sister household in at least two ways. First, whether or not the husband and wife are both
65 or over, their combined income is compared with a single need standard for the house-
hold. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382(a)(2), 1382c(f)(1) (1976). Second, for an eligible couple, that
standard is only the total need figure for two unmarried individuals with a joint house-
hold. Compare id. § 1382(a)(1)(A) with id. § 1382(a)(2)(A). SSI includes within its definition
of married couple "a man and woman ... found to be holding themselves out to the
community in which they reside as husband and wife." Id. § 1382c(d)(2). The program also
continues to treat eligible couples as a household for the first six months after they have
begun living apart. Id. § 1382c(b).
241 See id.
242 See id. §§ 402(b), (c), 416(b), (f), (h); Martin, supra note 80, at 805.
[Vol. 64:437
MINIMUM INCOME IN OLD AGE
marriage under some circumstances while SSI penalizes married
couples in the sense that it treats them less favorably than, say, a
brother and sister living together.243 The following example il-
lustrates the impact of the different treatment accorded married
couples under the two programs.
Year 1: Mr. and Mrs. Doe are age sixty and fifty-seven respec-
tively. Both have Social Security wage records, but Mr. Doe's re-
flects higher average wages and more consistent employment.
Consequently, Mrs. Doe, as a spouse, will receive additional ben-
efits beyond her retired-worker amount, especially after Mr. Doe
dies. Neither are "disabled," but a combination of deteriorating
health and limited education is causing a year-by-year reduction
in their earnings. OASI and SSI are not yet available to the pair.
Year 3: Mr. Doe is now sixty-two. He files for and receives
OASI retired-worker benefits which are actuarially reduced to re-
flect his "early retirement." Mr. Doe can continue to earn at his
"preretirement" level ($4,000 a year) and still receive significant
benefits. His wife's earnings and age have no effect on his ben-
efits.
Year 6: Mr. Doe is sixty-five at last. SSI benefits, as well as
Medicaid and Medicare, are now available to him. (His OASI
monthly benefit is slightly below the SSI need standard.) The re-
duction of his OASI because of early retirement is cancelled out
by SSI. But, if he continues to earn more than $780 per year, his
SSI will be reduced (fifty cents for each dollar above sixty-five
dollars per month). Furthermore, his wife, who is too young for
SSI, may adversely affect his benefits. She is now sixty-two and
can claim OASI retired-worker benefits, plus an additional
amount as the wife of a retired worker. Those benefits, plus the
earnings that she may continue to bring in without effect on
either spouse's OASI amount (so long as they fall below the
amount permitted by the "retirement test") are "deemed" to be
income to Mr. Doe for purposes of SSI. 2 44 Of course, assuming
SSI benefits of only thirty to forty dollars are at stake, the Does
may be better off despite their loss due to such "deemed" income.
Year 9: Mr. Doe is sixty-eight, Mrs. Doe sixty-five. They are
finally an SSI "eligible couple." That means simply that the SSI
standard of need for the household increases; the increase is less
than would occur if the two were not married. As before, the
243 See note 240 supra.
244 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(f)(1) (1976); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1185(a) (1978).
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OASI benefits and the earnings of both diminish their SSI ben-
efits.
Year 10: Mr. Doe dies. Mrs. Doe becomes an SSI individual
and a Social Security widow. So long as her widows benefits do
not put Mrs. Doe above the SSI standard of need plus twenty
dollars a month, the Social Security has no effect on Mrs. Doe's
total income unless reasonable earnings are still available to her.
Year 11: Mrs. Doe meets a widower, Mr. Roe, and the two
contemplate marriage. Mr. Roe is living on his OASI retired-
worker benefit, which is slightly above the point at which SSI
would be available. (His assets would disqualify him in any event.)
Marriage will not reduce OASI benefits for the two.245  But Mrs.
Doe's SSI will be lost, for a marriage (or even "living together as
husband and wife") will create a new couple for SSI purposes with
full attribution of income and assets between the "spouses." 246
3. Relationship to Other Income and Assets
Consistent with OASI's basic contributory character, the
program pays full benefits without regard to possession of other
assets and other "retirement" income. It also has a fairly generous
disregard of earned income which Congress has repeatedly in-
creased. In contrast, SSI has income and asset policies-forcing
consumption of most other resources before turning to SSI-
designed to assure that only the most needy receive its benefits.
For those potentially subject to the benefit policies of both pro-
grams, the difference in signals must be startling. The policies of
SSI prevail for individuals whose OASI falls significantly below
the SSI need standard.
a. Savings and Similar Provision for Eventual Self-Support Other
Than by Earnings. Future self-support is "encouraged" by OASI. It
is often said that the program furnishes a basic layer of support
upon which individuals, through savings, will add. Yet significant
pre-sixty-five savings merely create a disqualifying asset that must
be consumed by potential SSI recipients. Consequently, the SSI
incentives encourage full consumption of past savings during the
pre-SSI period, when OASI alone is available. 247
"' Even if Mrs. Doe is receiving widows benefits on the account of her deceased hus-
band, remarriage has no impact by virtue of a 1977 amendment. Social Security Amend-
ments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, sec. 336(a)(3), § 202(e)(4), 91 Stat. 1509 (to be codified
in 42 U.S.C. § 402).
246 See note 240 supra.
247 The eligibility rules of some state Old Age Assistance programs attempted to prevent
the most blatant forms of asset dissipation by would-be recipients. R. LEVY, T. LEwis & P.
MARTIN, supra note 14, at 111-12. SSI has nothing comparable.
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b. Earnings. SSI is also much more sensitive to earnings than
is OASI. As already noted, OASI is only slightly affected by earn-
ings at levels likely to be available to potential joint recipients and
then only until age seventy-two. The "supplementing" SSI, how-
ever, quickly disappears if the individual is earning more than
sixty-five dollars per month. The rate of reduction for earnings,
fifty cents per dollar, is the same for both programs, but OASI
totally disregards a monthly amount close to four times larger
than SSI's sixty-five dollars.2 48
D. State Supplementation of SSI
Due in part to federal "mandates," 249 most states supplement
SSI benefits for at least some needy elderly.250  Strong fiscal in-
centives have also led the majority of them to elect federal ad-
ministration of their supplementary benefits. 251  The federal
agency merely adds the state's money to the federal benefit check.
Recipients deal with one agency, the Social Security Administra-
tion, and receive SSI and state supplements in a single payment.
Because large-supplement states have particularly strong incentive
to choose federal administration, nearly ninety percent of all state
supplementary dollars are federally administered. 252
Some state supplements are simply indirect subsidies of cer-
tain special living arrangements for the elderly, such as adult fos-
ter homes. Several states limit supplements to such cases. 253  As a
consequence, in a slim majority of the states the federal SSI ben-
efit is the only public assistance available to an elderly individual
248 See 42 U.S.C. § 1382a(b)(4)(C) (1976); note 206 supra.
249 See text accompanying notes 196-99 supra.
250 See Quarterly Statistics, supra note 228, Table Q-23, at 91, Table Q-29, at 94.
2-1 In 1976, 26 states and the District of Columbia used federal administration for at
least some supplementary payments to the elderly. Quarterly Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., June
1977, Table Q-24, at 99. Twenty-four states administered their own supplements. Id.,
Table Q-30, at 102.
222 Compare Current Operating Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., Apr. 1977, Table M-22, at 78
with Current Operating Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., June 1977, Table M-29, at 70.
253 During 1976, for example, Alabama provided no supplements to elderly individuals
or couples living independently, but added $56.20 a month to the federal benefit for a
couple living in a "personal or foster care home." Arizona limited supplements to individu-
als or couples in licensed nursing homes, adding $145.20 a month to the federal benefit
for a couple in a private nursing home. Bureau of Supplemental Security Income, Social
Security Administration, HEW, Summary of State Payment Levels, State Supplementation,
and Medicaid Decisions 1, 3 (Revised Aug. 9, 1976 with addendum dated Sept. 2, 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Summary of State Supplementation].
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or couple living independently.254 At the other extreme lie a few
states that add $100 or more a month to the federal standard for
an individual and $150 or more for a couple.2 55  Table 6 shows
the range of state supplements, in relation to the poverty line, for
elderly persons living independently, as of September 1976.
TABLE 6
State Supplements for Individuals
and Couples Living Independently,
September, 1976
Supplement Number of States
$100 or more per individual, 3 states (Alas.,
$150 or more per couple Cal., Mass.)
Less than $100/$150 but
enough to bring both
individuals and couples 5 states (Conn., Idaho,
to the poverty line ($60 Neb., N.Y., Wis.)
or more per individual,
$33 or more per couple)
Not enough to bring an individual 9 states (Colo.,
to the poverty line, Mich., Minn., Nev.,
but meets that standard for a Okla., Pa., R.I.,
couple ($33 or more per couple) Vt., Wash.)
$10-$25 per individual and 4 states (Hawaii,
per couple Me., N.J., Or.)
Less than $10 per individual, 2 states (Ill., N.H.)
$0 per couple
No supplement for 27 states and D.C.
individual or couple
Source: Bureau of Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Administration, HEW,
Summary of State Payment Levels, State Supplementation, and Medicaid Decisions (Re-
vised Aug. 9, 1976 with addendum dated Sept. 2, 1976).
States electing federal administration must have income dis-
regards at least as generous as those contained in the basic federal
SSI benefit formula. States may disregard additional amounts or
types of income, but such disregards cannot affect benefits in the
income range in which federal SSI benefits are still being paid.
These disregards can come into play only for those with incomes
254 The total is 27 states and the District of Columbia. In all but 12, elderly persons
living in nursing homes or adult foster homes or other special care living situations re-
ceived some supplement. See id. at 1-35.
255 Id. at 2, 4, 13.
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above the federal SSI limit.25 Assuming that a state disregards
only the required twenty dollars a month of all types of income,
supplementary benefits have no effect on the relationship between
SSI.(as supplemented) and OASI, other than to increase the
amount of total benefits and therefore the range over which So-
cial Security does not affect the total income of the recipient
beyond the first twenty dollars a month. This effect should not be
belittled. The increase of the range is quite large in some states;
in a few, it extends up to the average retired-worker benefit. "15 7
When the state administers supplementary benefits, there are
no federal constraints on the treatment of OASI or other income.
Thus, a state can nullify the twenty dollars per month disregard
in SSI, placing recipients of OASI and other types of income on a
par. 258  There is little reason, however, to expect state-
administered supplementary benefits to have less respect for the
SSI disregards than federally-administered programs do. Con-
sequently, Figure 7 can be assumed to depict the relationship be-
tween OASI and SSI and state supplementary benefits generally,
not just for states that choose federal administration.
Since 1975, SSI has contained an automatic cost-of-living ad-
justment to accompany that in the basic Social Security program;
since 1976, "mandatory pass-through" has assured comparable ad-
justment of state supplementary benefits. 25 9  Prior to enactment
of the latter, the dynamic interaction between SSI and OASI-
over time-was as much subject to state control as OAA had
been,26 0 at least in states with a sizeable supplement. Currently,
the SSI-OASI benefit "system" assures upward adjustments for in-
flation to virtually all elderly covered by the "system."
Despite this coordination of OASI, SSI and state supple-
ments, several areas remain in which the existence of significant
state benefits can have an important impact on the OASI-SSI sys-
tem. First, by raising the income range over which OASI benefits
do not affect the total income of an individual or couple, state
256 20 C.F.R. § 416.2025 (1978).
257 In the latter half of 1976, that extension required a monthly state supplement of
between $35 to $40 for an individual living individually. Eight states were supplementing
at or above that level. See Summary of State Supplementation, supra note 253, at 1-35;
Quarterly Statistics, Soc. SEC. BULL., Dec. 1977, Table Q-4, at 75.
'58 This would be true, for example, if a state chose to supplement SSI $25 a month but
reduce the supplement one dollar for each dollar disregarded by SS1.
259 See text accompanying notes 196-99 supra.
260 See text accompanying notes 117-26 supra.
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supplements can accentuate all the features of the basic federal
program, including its offset of the "early retirement" reduction
of OASI, its override of Social Security incentives for savings and
earnings, and its identification of old age with age sixty-five. A
state can, by providing public assistance at or near SSI levels prior
to age sixty-five, reduce or eliminate the effects of SSI's age sixty-
five threshold; however, such assistance is rare. 21 t Far more
common is an additional state SSI supplement for eligible indi-
viduals living with a younger spouse not old enough for SSI. In
late 1976, the SSI supplement programs of eight states contained
such a benefit.2" 2  This form of indirect support for the younger
spouse (without a specific age limit) eases some of the transition
problems for the married couple that the differing age thresholds
of OASI and SSI create.
The structure of state supplements can also affect the mar-
riage penalty that SSI contains. Treatment of a married couple
household as an economic unit-with the income of one spouse
assumed to be available for both-is required of federally-
administered state supplements and is no doubt included in
state-administered programs as well. But state benefits that sup-
plement couples more generously than individuals offset the sac-
261 State and local programs of general assistance to needy individuals not within the
coverage of federally supported welfare programs (SSI and AFDC) typically have much
lower payment standards. Often, they furnish only temporary or emergency assistance. See
STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 93D CONG., 2D SESS.,
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS: 1975, at 349-56 (Studies in Public Wel-
fare, Paper No. 20, 1974).
262 See Summary of State Supplementation, supra note 253, at 1-35.
State Old Age Assistance plans had been permitted to include the needs of a person
living in the same household and "essential" to the well-being of the recipient in calculating
the recipient's needs. Most OAA plans made some provisions for such "essential persons."
The rubric allowed indirect coverage of the younger spouse. See PUBLIC INCOME TRANSFER,
supra note 129, at 101, 102.
SSI contains no generally available "essential person" increment. However, a grand-
fathering provision applies to that dwindling number of recipients who had an "essential
person" recognized under one of the predecessor programs (OAA, Aid to the Blind, Aid
to the Permanently and Totally Disabled) when they were transferred to SSI in 1974. See
Act of July 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-66, § 211, 87 Stat. 152. In December 1975, there were
65,690 such "essential persons," 88.5% of them spouses; in December 1976, 47,051, 89.2%
of them spouses. OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
HEW, PROGRAM AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY BEN-
EFICIARIES, DECEMBER 1975, Table 31, at 53 (1977); OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS,
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, HEW, PROGRAM AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY BENEFICIARIES, DECEMBER 1976, Table 31, at 55 (1977).
In the latter half of 1978, a grandfathered "essential person" added $94.80 a month to
the federal standard for an individual eligible for SSI. 43 Fed. Reg. 20,867, 20,868 (1978).
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rifice in payment standard upon marriage that the federal benefit
scheme contains. The supplements of two states (California and
Colorado) result in combined federal and supplementary benefits
for a couple precisely twice those paid an individual.263
Overall, however, such reshaping of the SSI benefit scheme
through supplements is rare. From a national perspective, state
supplements appear to have limited effect on the OASI-SSI rela-
tionship beyond expanding the range of SSI in a number of
states, quite significantly in a few.
Ix
PROSPECTS FOR GREATER COORDINATION
In 1974, Congress enacted SSI, a public assistance program,
to go alongside the social insurance program, OASI. The latter
itself had by then taken on many "welfare" features largely be-
cause of the prior lack of an adequate public assistance program
for the elderly. Initially, Congress left those features undisturbed;
it made no coordinating changes in OASI and shaped SSI without
evident attention to that program's interaction with Social Se-
curity.
Since 1974, Congress has acknowledged this interaction, but
has yet to address most major issues of coordination. The most
fundamental question is: Should Congress shift more of the task
of providing minimally adequate old-age benefits from OASI to
SSI? Congress must also consider how to treat those who could
potentially qualify for benefits under either or both programs.
Three groups deserve particular attention: (1) elderly who had
been steadily employed low-wage workers dependent on their in-
come from OASI-covered work; (2) elderly whose marginal cov-
ered employment results from marginal employment overall;
and (3) elderly whose marginal covered employment masks sig-
nificant uncovered work-most notably, longtime federal civil
servants with comparatively generous public pensions ("double-
dippers").
A. The Basic Division of Labor
As a device for assuring a minimally adequate income to the
elderly, OASI has several major drawbacks. Because the program
2G See Summary of State Supplementation, supra note 253, at 4.
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lacks a "need" test, Social Security benefits justified on grounds of
minimum adequacy will reach some who have a more than
adequate income from other sources, including a significant
number of the now-notorious "double-dippers." Moreover, the
wage taxes that finance OASI, whatever their merit as a base for
the "insurance" strand in the program, compare unfavorably with
the federal income tax as a method of paying for public assis-
tance.
The existence of SSI makes it possible to shift public assis-
tance functions assumed by OASI to a program that will perform
them more efficiently and more equitably. Yet an examination of
the major "minimum adequacy" features of Social Security reveals
that realignment of the program with SSI requires complicated
surgery. Few of those features so completely express welfare aims
that straightforward excision can be viewed as an attractive re-
form. Most call for new and complex adjustments to OASI or SSI,
or both.
1. Inflated Benefit Levels for Those with Limited Covered
Employment -OASI's Minimum Benefit
One bit of simple surgery does seem desirable and possible.
With SSI available, there is no reason for OASI to pay a substan-
tial minimum benefit to those who have had only marginal cov-
ered employment. That minimum should be removed.
In 1977, Congress took a hesitant step in that direction. As
part of a major overhaul of the system, it froze the "minimum
benefit." The 1977 amendments permanently fix the minimum
PIA at the December 1978 figure, rounded off to the next highest
dollar-122. 2 6 4 The Report of the House Ways and Means
Committee tied the change to the existence of SSI:
Freezing the minimum emphasizes that the supplemental
security income (SSI) program is an appropriate source of in-
come for needy aged, blind, or disabled people. ... The com-
mittee believes that this is a more efficient and appropriate
method of dealing with the problem of poverty for those who
have only a marginal attachment to work covered by social se-
curity. 265
264 Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, sec. 201, §
215(a)(1)(C)(i)(1), 91 Stat. 1509 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 415).
265 H.R. REP. No. 702, 95th Cong., 1st Sess, pt. 1, at 32, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4155, 4189.
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The report noted that "[ilncreasingly, the minimum benefit is
being paid to people who did not, during their working years,
rely on their covered earnings as a primary source of support."
To some of them-notably federal civil servants with lengthy
employment in uncovered work producing a public pension-the
minimum is a "windfall." Finally, the report pointed out that
freezing the minimum would have little or no effect on "low-paid
workers who worked regularly under the social security pro-
gram." 2 6 6
On the House floor, Representative James C. Corman
(Chairman of the Public Assistance Subcommittee of the Commit-
tee on Ways and Means) offered an amendment that would have
eliminated the minimum. 67  He argued that "freezing" the
minimum responded inadequately to the considerations the com-
mittee recited. The amendment failed by a vote of 131 to 271.268
The arguments for eliminating the minimum are compelling,
and quite possibly Congress will return to the proposal. The
likelihood that elimination will replace the gradual "real" reduc-
tion, achieved by the 1977 freeze, rests in part on whether Con-
gress extends Social Security coverage to presently uncovered fed-
eral and state employees. So long as they remain uncovered, the
minimum generates a particularly troublesome "windfall" to the
significant fraction of those workers who by retirement have
enough work in the private sector to qualify for Social Security. 26'9
2. The Weighted Benefit Formula
Although the 1977 amendments reduced the importance of
the minimum, they reaffirmed-for some, even increased-the
weighting of the benefit schedule in favor of those with low aver-
age earnings over a lifetime of employment. By most measure-
ments, the steadily employed low-wage worker will, under the
revised benefit formula, do as well in comparison with the aver-
age- or high-income earner as before.270
266 Id. at 31-32, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4188-89.
267 See 123 CONG. REc. Hll,612 to H11,615 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1977).
268 Id. at H1i,615.
269 Representative Corman introduced his elimination amendment only after the House
had rejected extension of OASI coverage to public employees. Id. at H 1,613. The final
1977 legislation directs HEW to study "the feasibility and desirability" of such an extension
or, as the act puts it, "universal coverage." Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L.
No. 95-216, § 311, 91 Stat. 1509 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 902 note (West Supp. 1978)).
270 For 1979 the amendments intentionally adjusted the new formula to provide slightly
lower PIAs, on average, than the old formula would have, but preserved the relative advan-
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Do the arguments for eliminating the minimum apply equally
to the benefit formula's severe "tilt" in favor of those with a his-
tory of steady but low average earnings? Some seem persuaded
that they do. At the time of SSI's passage, one commentator ob-
served that
[t]he existence of a large, uniform Federal benefit program for
the low-income aged will force congressional attention on the
question of structural changes in social security. That is, the
need for a special minimum social security benefit and the need
for a heavy weighting of the benefit schedule in favor of the low-wage
worker will diminish, and the benefits paid out under these pro-
visions will become less efficient in reducing poverty. 271
Linking the minimum and the weighted formula in this way
ignores a fact to which Congress was quite sensitive in 1977. The
minimum provides advantage only to those who have had very
slight contact with covered employment. The weighted formula,
in contrast, benefits many who have had a long period of
earnings-based self-sufficiency. Moreover, because it falls signifi-
cantly below the SSI payment standard, the minimum keeps no
one off public assistance. The weighted formula, on the other
hand, provides large enough benefits to those above the very bot-
tom of the scale to keep them off SSI. Providing a constant ratio
of OASI benefits to covered average indexed earnings would, like
removing the minimum, deny "windfall" benefits to former public
employees whose low average covered wages resulted from few
covered years out of many years of work. But leveling the for-
mula would also allocate to SSI a major share .of the old-age in-
come support of steadily employed low-wage workers. Indeed, a
flat Social Security formula with a benefit-earnings ratio pegged at
the current rate for middle-income workers would bring many
more retired workers, including some middle-wage workers with-
out private pensions, into SSI. In the process, these workers
would necessarily shift from OASI's to SSI's policies concerning
earnings, savings and marriage. To qualify for SSI, they would
have to exhaust any individual savings for old age, losing, as a
consequence, any incentive to save in anticipation of retirement.
tage of the low-wage worker. See H.R. REP. No. 702, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 23-24,
reprinted in [1977] U.S. CONG. CODE & AD. NEws 4155, 4180-81. In addition, those eligible
for benefits before 1984 may use the old formula if it produces a higher PIA. Social Se-
curity Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, sec. 201, § 215(a)(4)(B), 91 Stat. 1509 (to
be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 415).
271 IMPACT OF SSI, supra note 122, at 5 (emphasis added).
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The prospect is not an attractive one. Strong reasons point
toward fixing the boundary between OASI and SSI at a line that
assures that "persons regularly employed at even minimum wage
levels ... receive reasonable insurance protection without resort-
ing to assistance [SSI]. except under exceptional conditions of
need." 2 72
This allocation principle does not, however, support retention
of the present OASI formula. The formula fails on two counts.
First, it inflates benefits for some who have marginal covered
work, most conspicuously, the "double-dippers." Second, it falls
short of guaranteeing the steadily employed low-wage worker
enough Social Security to avoid reliance on SSI. Although at first
glance the formula appears adequate for such a worker when
judged against the SSI standard, that holds only if he first collects
OASI at age sixty-five. With benefits begun at age sixty-two (or
272 J. BROWN, AN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SECURITY 58 (1972). Brown sets this
as the "upper side" of the desirable "boundary" between "protection by assistance" and "by
social insurance." Id. His companion proposition is that social insurance should not be
stretched to cover those with marginal contact with employment:
A simple first approximation in establishing the model area of coverage for
public assistance is that it should protect those persons whose earnings under
contributory insurance coverage would be inadequate to form a sufficient base
for insured protection. Social insurance is insurance in the sense of relating ben-
efits to a loss of income normally received. If the income lost is already in-
adequate, ... reliance on the insurance mechanism would be inappropriate.
Id. at 57 (emphasis in original). See also Ball, Some Reflections on Selected Issues in Social
Security, in SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 90TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
OLD AGE INCOME ASSURANCE pt. 1, at 48, 52-53 (Comm. Print 1967).
The preference for Social Security as the vehicle of income assurance for the low-
income worker derives from its identification with earnings. The 1965 Advisory Council
expressed the point in this fashion:
[T]he Council believes that where it can be properly applied [social insurance]
is much to be preferred to the method of public assistance, with its test of
individual need, and the Council therefore strongly favors the improvement of
social insurance as a way of reducing the need for assistance. The Council rec-
ognizes the need for an adequate public assistance program, but it believes that
assistance should play the role of a secondary and supplemental program de-
signed to meet special needs and circumstances which cannot be dealt with
satisfactorily by other means.
No matter how well designed and administered, assistance has serious in-
herent disadvantages in terms of human dignity .... People view receipt of
assistance as meaning a loss of self-support. In contrast, they view social insur-
ance as an extension of self-support. People who have led productive lives and
have supported themselves through their own efforts do not want to see their
self-reliance end with their ability to work.
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, THE STATUS OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT (1965), reprinted in Soc. SEC. BULL., Mar.
1965, at 3, 5.
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sixty in the case of a widow or widower)-the assumption that
corresponds more closely to when beneficiaries in fact file-OASI
monthly amounts for the low-income worker fall within the SSI
range (see Tables 4 & 5). The fundamental problem with the
present weighted formula is that it blurs together quite different
groups of people. Those it favors-individuals with low average
wages over the base period-include those with steady low wages
and others having sporadic covered wages for a variety of reasons.
On grounds of efficiency and equity, some (but not all) of them
should be denied special treatment under Social Security, now
that SSI provides more than adequate replacement protection.
A feature of OASI materially strengthened in 1977 shows one
way to separate these groups. Congress increased the "special
minimum" (added in 1972 for low-wage workers with many years
of coverage) to the point where it now assures a PIA of $11.50 for
each year of coverage in excess of ten but not more than
thirty.2 73 For the worker with a full thirty years, that produces a
minimum PIA of $230 for 1979. This minimum, in sharp contrast
to the regular minimum frozen by Congress in 1977, is paid to
those with a history of steady low-wage employment, rather than
those who have marginal covered work.
Only a modest additional increase in the "special minimum"
would assure that a thirty-year worker employed at the minimum
wage would receive a large enough OASI benefit, even if begun
at age sixty-two, to meet SSI's standard of adequacy. Increasing
the multiplier for those with low average indexed earnings would
achieve the same effect, but less efficiently. 274 As with the regu-
lar minimum, this inefficiency is particularly troublesome so long
as public employees remain uncovered by Social Security. If Con-
gress increased the special minimum sufficiently to assure an
adequate retirement income to the steadily employed low-wage
worker, the heavy weighting of low average indexed earnings
could be cut back.
273 Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, sec. 201,
§ 215(a)(1)(c)(i)(II), 91 Stat. 1509 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 415). The $11.50 figure will
subsequently be adjusted to reflect average-wage increases. Id. sec. 201(g)(1),
§ 215(i)(2)(A)(ii). Thus, the 1977 amendments fail to follow the path suggested by some-
elimination of both the minimum benefit and weighted benefit formula-to turn OASI
into a fairly pure contributory system. See IMPAcT OF SSI, supra note 122, at 83-84.
274 The inefficiency lies in its also producing increased benefits for those without a his-
tory of steady employment in covered work.
512
MINIMUM INCOME IN OLD AGE
3. Spouse Benefits
The 1939 addition of OASI benefits for surviving and de-
pendent spouses, and subsequent improvements in benefits for
spouses-particularly widows benefits-were strongly motivated
by a concern with minimum adequacy.275 What implications does
SSI have for these features of the Social Security system?
With SSI available to the widow of a marginally employed
male, there is less reason to retain such spouse benefits-or their
present fraction of the worker's PIA-as a welfare measure in
such a case. Yet without major changes in the OASI structure to
assure greater benefit equality between men and women and
more equitable treatment of the many women who divide their
time between home and work, spouse benefits simply cannot be
eliminated. 6  SSI alone is an inadequate replacement. If major
reforms occur, ,however, the existence of SSI should ease the re-
moval of these "welfare" features from OASI.
4. Old-Age Benefits Prior to Age Sixty-Five
Income needs associated with old age often begin before age
sixty-five- particularly for those with lower Social Security ben-
efits or none. Congress has lowered the age threshold for OASI
in response to this phenomenon.277 SSI ought to extend at least
to the same ages. The existence of a significant age band for
which OASI is available but SSI is not (currently five years in the
case of a widow or widower) puts pressure on OASI to perform
essentially "public assistance" functions. A coordinating step less
drastic but also less complete than lowering the general age
threshold for SSI would be to add an SSI benefit increment to
cover the younger (needy) spouse of a person meeting the age
sixty-five eligibility test. The younger spouse of an SSI recipient
can claim OASI at age sixty-two. SSI currently treats the couple as
an economic unit for purposes of charging those OASI benefits
against the older spouse's SSI amount but not for setting that
amount. The couple should be treated as a unit for both pur-
poses.
2' See Martin, supra note 80, at 795-801; text accompanying notes 157-59 supra.
276 See HEW, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE TREATMENT OF WOMEN UNDER SOCIAL
SECURITY (1978) (comparing a wide range of "reform" proposals); HEW, SOCIAL SECURITY
AND THE CHANGING ROLES OF MEN AND WOMEN (1979); Martin, supra note 80, at 828-29.
Some proposals add to the value of spouse benefits rather than eliminating them. See id. at
826.
277 See text accompanying notes 160-66 supra.
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5. Benefits for Those with Little or No Contribution
The existence of SSI should curb any congressional desire to
repeat the mid-sixties experiments with special Social Security
benefits for those with slight or no contribution. Its existence also
points toward eliminating those enduring features of the regular
benefit scheme that permit benefits to go to such individuals. The
distinction between steadily employed low-wage workers and indi-
viduals "who have only a marginal attachment to work covered by
social security" applies here. Workers qualify for Social Security
on the basis of "quarters of coverage." Congress should consider
tightening that basic eligibility unit.
With SSI in place, there seems far less reason than before to
count years of income below the SSI need standard (e.g., $2,000)
toward OASI eligibility. In 1978, the test for coverage rose from
the historic fifty dollars of covered earnings per quarter to $1,000
in a year (for four quarters of coverage-five times the previous
test). Years with earnings below $250 are taxed and figured into
the benefit formula but do not count toward the initial eligibility
test of "insured status." Congress should increase the test figure.
B. Possible Financing Changes
The same figure could set an annual minimum below which
Social Security would not tax or record earnings for benefit pur-
poses. While OASI carried a heavy minimum-income responsibil-
ity, the comparatively large entitlement it eventually triggered jus-
tified the program's tax on very low incomes. SSI undercuts that
justification. Consider the point at which Social Security takes over
from SSI for a person claiming benefits at sixty-two (see Table 5).
Assuming fairly steady employment, a person with average
monthly earnings of $267 as of 1978 will have had to pay approx-
imately 3.6% of those wages in Social Security tax. 2 78  His
employer will have paid a like amount, which, in effect, the
worker probably bore as well.279
278 Such a person would, for example, have paid 1.5% on earnings of $1540 in 1951
and 4.375% on earnings of $5,200 in 1977. A table of the OASI tax rates is contained in
History of the Provisions of Old-Age, Survivors, Disability, and Health Insurance, 1975 ANN. SuPP.,
supra note 7, at 15, 32. The rates cited here are for OASI alone. The companion taxes to
support the Disability Insurance program and Medicare are not included. The average rate
is calculated by assuming a wage profile that parallels-year by year, from 1950 on (see
Table 4)-the median for a person of the hypothetical individual's age but an average
monthly earning figure of $267.
7-' "Most economists now think that, in spite of the intent of the law, the entire tax is
borne by the employee." A. MUNNELL, supra note 18, at 86-87.
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When persons with annual earned incomes in this neighbor-
hood turn sixty-five, they qualify as needy under the SSI stan-
dard.28 0  Depending on family size and composition, they may be
eligible for other forms of public assistance before sixty-five. 281
And they are free from the federal income tax because of a clear
policy that low-income families, should not be required to pay. 28 2
Nonetheless, such individuals are forced to contribute large an-
nual sums for their old-age income support.28 3  Recently, some of
these needy have been shielded from the impact of the Social
Security tax by the earned income tax credit, which provides a
refundable credit for low-income workers supporting children. 28 4
In effect, the credit funds such workers' contributions out of gen-
eral revenues. But the current earned income tax credit shields
only those low-income workers who have children in their homes.
In addition to that limitation of scope, this device has the disad-
vantage of holding those with sporadic and low wages within So-
cial Security. Their wages are taxed and counted toward eventual
Social Security funded out of the Social Security tax; the credit
merely removes the burden of the tax from some during their
working years.
The existence of SSI should prompt serious consideration of
a more direct and complete approach-keeping those with mar-
180 The "earned income disregard" resulted in SSI being available to persons with earn-
ings of $440.60 a month ($5,287 on an annual basis) during the latter half of 1977. (For
couples, the figures were higher.)
21 During 1977, the Food Stamp program reached two-person households with earned
incomes up to $292 a month and three-person (and larger) households with earnings well
above that amount (considering only the program's $30 per month earned income disre-
gard and none of the other potential exclusions). See 42 Fed. Reg. 22,356 (1977); 7 C.F.R.
§ 271.3 (1977). In a number of states, AFDC payments were made to households with
earnings of $5,200. See ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL AND REHABILITA-
TION SERVICE, HEW, CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE PLANS FOR AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPEN-
DENT CHILDREN UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT TITLE IV-A (1976 ed.).
282 The Tax Reform Act of 1969 established a Low Income Allowance to shield "the
poor" from the federal income tax. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172,
§ 802, 83 Stat. 487 (repealed 1977); Dodyk, The Tax Reform Act of 1969 and the Poor, 71
COLUM. L. REv. 758, 786 (1971). The successor of that device is an initial zero rate bracket
in the tax, which, combined with the personal exemption deduction and the general tax
credit, set a $5,200 tax threshold for a married couple in 1977. I.R.S. 1977 TAX TABLES,
Table B. See I.R.C. §§ 1(a), 42, 151.
283 And these amounts are rising steadily. The 1977 amendments remedied the system's
financial imbalance, in part, through a schedule of tax rate increases. See Social Security
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 101, 91 Stat. 1509 (to be codified in 26 U.S.C.
§ 3101); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 837, 95TH CONG., IST SESs. 64, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4308, 4310.
284 I.R.C. § 43.
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ginal employment and slight wages out of the contributory
scheme altogether. Annual wages below $250 do not count toward
OASI's "insured status" test. With SSI available to needy older
persons, there is no reason to tax wages at such a low level. In-
deed, a substantially higher threshold for both contribution and
establishing "insured status" appears desirable. A figure of $1,000
or even $2,000 would excuse many needy individuals from the
tax, yet leave the steadily employed low-wage worker in the sys-
tem.
The Social Security program currently "subsidizes" all
recipients-both former high-income workers and low. All receive
benefits well beyond the value of their past contributions, paid for
by the current work force-an "intergenerational transfer" of
considerable magnitude.185  Focusing benefits at the bottom to as-
sure the steadily employed low-wage worker an income above the
SSI need standard implies only a modest shift of that intergenera-
tional subsidy from high benefits to low. Shifting some of the sub-
sidy of the low average-earnings person with relatively few years
of coverage from OASI to SSI actually implies a reduction of the
amount of the subsidy that the Social Security tax bears-an in-
creasingly attractive proposition as the ratio of those supported by
OASI to those supporting it grows.
C. Desirable Adjustments to SSI
A more rational and equitable fit between SSI and OASI re-
quires some changes on the SSI side as well. The need for a coor-
dinated age threshold has already been addressed. Another obvi-
ous target for reform is SSI's treatment of OASI income.
Reducing SSI payments one dollar for each dollar of OASI,
beyond the first twenty dollars, neutralizes at least two features of
Social Security. It cancels out the benefit reduction for pre-sixty-
five retirement-which is particularly troublesome so long as the
programs' age thresholds remain different-and denies the low-
wage worker whose OASI falls below the SSI "break-even point"
the sense of return on contribution. As one study put it:
Setting the SSI level at an amount that is only a few dollars
below the average social security benefit lowers the value of so-
285 See Ozawa, Individual Equity versus Social Adequacy in Federal Old-Age Insurance, 48 Soc.
SERV. REv. 24 (1974). The amount of the "intergenerational transfer" will inevitably fall
now that the system is both mature and nearly universal. By 2020F it is likely to be gone for
the retired high-wage worker. A. MUNNELL, supra note 18, at 40-41.
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cial security to individuals who receive both types of benefits.
The feeling that a large part of their retirement income is
earned through a lifetime of payroll tax payments may be of
psychological value to individuals who receive small SSI sup-
plements. But the psychological value may succumb to reality
when a retired worker realizes that the payroll tax he has paid
gives him no more income than if he had worked less or not at
all. ... Twenty dollars a month may seem to be a small return
to an individual who has worked and paid increasingly higher
social security taxes for many years.2 "
A disregard of twenty or thirty percent of OASI (and similar re-
tirement benefits) would solve this problem. It would also increase
the adequacy of the system for joint recipients. Currently, neither
SSI alone nor SSI coupled with OASI assures a poverty-line in-
come to eligible individuals or couples. State supplements take re-
cipients across that line in only a few states (see Table 6). Adding
a thirty percent OASI disregard to SSI would assure a poverty-
line income to many joint recipients.287
The importance of such a change in SSI depends heavily
upon whether Congress adjusts the OASI benefit to assure an in-
come significantly higher than the SSI standard to all steadily
employed low-income workers, including those starting benefits at
age sixty-two. Should Congress reshape Social Security along the
lines suggested earlier in this section, far less reason would exist
to give joint recipients some proportionate return on their Social
Security contributions; under such a system, no one who has
made a substantial contribution will end up as a joint recipient.
D. Will SSI Survive?
The foregoing discussion assumes the relative permanence of
SSI. In 1977, however, President Carter proposed that Congress
abolish SSI as part of a comprehensive plan for welfare re-
2. IMPACT OF SSI, supra note 122, at 84. Numerous others have since made the point.
E.g., A. MUNNELL, supra note 18, at I1-12.
211 In 1976, $60 a month separated the SSI payment standard from the poverty level for
an elderly individual. For couples, the gap was $33. In December 1976, the average
monthly OASI benefit received by SSI-OASI joint recipients was $137.50. OFFICE OF RE-
SEARCH AND STATISTICS, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, HEW, PROGRAM AND DEMO-
GRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY BENEFICIARIES, DECEMBER 1976,
Table 19, at 42 (1977). With a 30% disregard, the average benefit would have added
$41.50 to the combined income of a recipient rather than the flat $20 provided by the
actual SSI disregard.
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form.2 8 8  Introduced in the House as H.R. 9030, the plan called
for a new federal public assistance program to replace AFDC, SSI,
Food Stamps, and significant aspects of state and local general
assistance programs.2 89  It promised an SSI-like reform for those
categories of the poor presently covered by AFDC or no federally
supported cash assistance program at all. But because that reform
was to be accomplished without major additional federal expendi-
ture, it necessarily threatened the SSI population, which currently
enjoys a higher standard of support than other segments of the
poor.
Those representing the elderly generally opposed the legisla-
tion because it jeopardized the improvements gained through
SSI.29 ° These opponents viewed the proposed standard of sup-
port as inferior, particularly since the administration's bill con-
tained no automatic cost-of-living adjustment.2 91 Many of the SSI
features highlighted in this Article, however, were preserved in
the new proposal. Indeed, it included a few of the coordinating
elements suggested in this final section. For example, although
the proposed program distinguished sharply between employables
and unemployables and placed the SSI population (those sixty-five
and over, blind or disabled) in the latter, high benefit group, it
did offer modest assistance payments to needy individuals and
couples below sixty-five.292 It also contained a twenty percent
disregard for OASI benefits.29 3
288 See President's Message to Congress on Welfare Reform, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 1205 (Aug. 6, 1977).
2"9 "This new program will ... [iteduce complexity by consolidating the current AFDC,
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and the Food Stamp programs, all of which have
differing eligibility requirements, into a single cash assistance program, providing for the
first time a uniform minimum Federal payment for the poor." Id. The plan would not,
however, have abolished the categorically different treatment of the elderly (and blind and
disabled). It set higher payment levels for such individuals and special earned income dis-
regards. H.R. 9030, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., § 101 (1977).
290 See Welfare Reform and the Elderly Poor: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Aging,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 15-16, 24, pt. 2, at 26-27 (1977); Administration's Welfare
Reform Proposal: Joint Hearings Before the Welfare Reform Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Agric., Comm. on Educ. and Labor, and Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4,
at 2517-60 (1977).
291 Welfare Reform and the Elderly Poor: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Aging,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 62 (1977) (statement of Max Serchuk, President, Dade
County Council of Senior Citizens and Member of the Executive Board, National Council
of Senior Citizens).
292 See note 289 supra. The bili contained a payment standard, for a 64 year old indi-
vidual, of $91.67 a month compared to $208.33 for a 65 year old. H.R. 9030; 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., § 101 (1977).
293 See H.R. 9030, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 101 (1977).
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The President's bill, substantially rewritten by a special House
subcommittee, failed to win necessary support in the 95th Con-
gress.2'94 Most now see alternative plans for "incremental" reform
as the best-and only-hope for legislative action in the near
future. "Incremental" reform, virtually by definition, leaves SSI
intact and focuses on the younger population presently served, if
at all, by AFDC.2 zJ5
Despite its short life, SSI has apparently acquired sufficient
support-especially among the elderly, who are an increasingly
organized and politically effective group-that neither its central
features nor its program identity are likely to fall victim to welfare
reform.
CONCLUSION
During the long period when no adequate national program
provided need-tested benefits for the elderly, Social Security as-
sumed many "welfare" characteristics. Now an adequate public as-
sistance program -SSI-exists, and financing Social Security
benefits has become an economic and political problem of major
proportions. Set against its long-term fiscal demands, the funds
OASI distributes to meet "welfare" needs seem modest; yet they
are not insignificant. Currently, Social Security pays substantially
more to needy elderly people than does SSI.2:)6 Further, Social
Security pays sizeable additional benefits-designed, like the
minimum, largely with the needy in mind-to those who fail to
meet the SSI standard or any other reasonable test of need. Shift-
ing greater responsibility for minimum income assurance to SSI
could relieve some of the pressure on the Social Security tax
structure. In addition to these financing considerations, the need
for equitable benefit distribution also calls for reallocation of re-
sponsibility between the two programs as well as greater coordina-
tion at the individual-benefit level.
The two major federal programs paying cash income to older
Americans-Social Security and SSI-have only recently attained
294 H.R. 10950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). See Compromise Talks Open in Effort to Salvage
Some Welfare Reform, 36 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1064-68 (1978).
295 The two important "incremental" reform bills introduced in 1978-the Ullman bill
(H.R. 10711, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)) and the Baker-Bellmon bill (S. 2777, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1978))-left SSI intact. See Compromise Talks Open in Effort to Salvage Some Welfare
Reform, supra note 294, at 1065.
296 See note 232 supra.
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near comprehensive coverage and comparatively high levels of
support. Before the advent of SSI, which brought the need-tested
programs for the elderly into federal hands, few realistic pos-
sibilities for coordination between social insurance and public as-
sistance existed. Today, these possibilities are manifest and the ar-
guments for greater coordination are compelling.
